Empirical study of Rawls' political philosphy: Impartiality vs. metaphysics.

Abstract

Frohlich and Oppenheimer's works aim to study empirically Rawls' philosophy. They replicate the original position, using a veil of ignorance covering the subjects' deliberations. This should provide empirical data usable by philosophers, a claim discussed here: Rawls' foundationalism precludes a genuine opening of his philosophy to empirical data. On the other hand, Rawls' distinction between natural and moral justice attitudes sheds light on the deterministic metaphysics indirectly required by the Rawlsian sense of justice. This leads to the question of the empirical feasibility of the theory: is doing without preinstitutional meritocratic attitudes humanly possible? Studies investigating the influence of socialization on causal attribution suggest that the feeling of free will is not a fundamental need of the human mind.