Endogenous Coalition Formation in Global Pollution Control

Abstract

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Environmental Problems

“…In this paper we have presented a set of simple applications of Non Cooperative and Co-operative Game Theory to environmental problems involving even only a pair of actors and so outside the main stream of, for instance, [FR01]. The paper represents a starting point and the topics investigated in it need surely further theoretical and practical studies.…”

“…In this section we are going to examine a co-operative game based on the RSG paradigm ( [FR01]). Such a game is based on two stages:…”

Is trade liberalization conducive to the formation of climate coalitions?

“…1 also apply in the autarky regime. The results of the Propositions 1-3 for the autarky regime are known from the literature for linear and quadratic functional forms of the functions V + T and D (Carraro and Siniscalco 1991;Finus 2001;De Cara and Rotillon 2001;Finus and Rundshagen 2001;Rubio and Casino 2001). The new information our paper contributes is that for general functions V, T and D the Propositions 1-3 hold in autarky as well as in case of free trade.…”

“…Finus and Rundshagen (2001), Rubio and Casino (2001) and De Cara and Rotillon (2001) have independently proved that the self-enforcing IEA consists of at most two countries in the quadratic basic model of the literature, (22). From (20) and (22) follows that if a stable coalition of size m = 2 exists [does not exist] in the economy defined by the parameters (β,δ,ρ) in (22), it also exists [does not exist] in every economy (α, β, γ, δ) ∈ E(β,δ,ρ), where E(β,δ,ρ) := (α, β, γ, δ) ∈ R 4 + β =β, δ =δ and α + γ =ρ .…”

International Environmental Agreements with Asymmetric Countries: Climate Clubs vs. Global Cooperation

“…Finus and Rundshagen (2001) analyze a model with symmetric countries that play coalition formation games. In equilibrium, their results show that countries form multiple coalition structures.…”