Endogenous Domestic Institutions in Two-Level Games and Parliamentary Oversight of the European Union

Pahre, Robert

doi:10.1177/0022002797041001007

Cited by 112 publications

(91 citation statements)

References 24 publications

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“…Work inspired by Putnam's (1988) twolevel game metaphor has examined how parliaments can shape domestic win-sets (the range of acceptable options to domestic constituents) through ratification and veto powers, which affects both the likelihood of international agreements and the advantages that domestic constraints can give leaders in international bargaining (Pahre 1997;Martin 2001;Hill 2003). Research on the role of political oppositions (Hagan 1993) and decision units (Hagan and Hermann 2001) also notes the importance of parliaments as centres for opposition and as potential veto players in fluid and dynamic decision making practices that exist alongside institutional authority.…”

Section: Parliamentary Influence In Security Policymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Research on two-level games, decision units, and the democratic peace notes real variation in parliamentary powers in foreign affairs (see Pahre 1997;Wagner 2006;Mello 2012). Born (2004: 209-11) classifies parliamentary powers in security affairs in terms of 'authority' ('the power which Parliament uses to hold government accountable ... derived from the constitutional and legal framework as well as customary practices'), 'ability' (the parliamentary resources of special committees, budget and staff necessary to use legal authority), and 'attitude' (the 'willingness to hold the executive to account').…”

Section: Institutional Legal and Constitutional Authoritymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…First, as Pahre (1997) notes, it can be misleading to think of parliamentary power as separate from, and exogenous to, cabinets and executives in parliamentary systems since the executive is born out of the parliament and the parties in the cabinet are also in the legislature. Second, decision units research (on the 10 different types of decision units that can form with each decision point) shows that policy authority is often more fluid than implied by strictly institutional or constitutional readings of parliamentary powers (Hagan and Hermann 2001).…”

Section: Institutional Legal and Constitutional Authoritymentioning

confidence: 99%

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No, prime minister: explaining the House of Commons’ vote on intervention in Syria

Kaarbo

Kenealy

2015

European Security

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On 29 August 2013 the UK House of Commons inflicted the first defeat on a PrimeMinister over a matter of war and peace since 1782. Recalled to debate and vote on UK intervention in Syria, the Commons humbled the government and crucially impacted the development of UK foreign policy. This article places that vote, and the developments leading to it, in the context of the role of parliaments in security policy and explores the relationships between parliamentary influence, leadership, intra-party and intra-coalition politics, and public opinion. From an in-depth analysis of leaders' statements and parliamentary debate, we find a combination of intra-party politics and party leadership were most significant. An additional factor -the role of historical precedent -was also important. Our analysis explores the fluidity and interconnectedness of the various factors for parliamentary influence in foreign policy and offers directions for future theoretical development and empirical research.Keywords: foreign policy analysis; decision-making; UK foreign policy; parliaments. 2'A leader humbled, a nation cut down to size ' (Rachman 2013 This was an unusual case of a parliament defying a PM's preference on a decision to deploy military force. This vote was unprecedented in UK politics and challenges conventional wisdom that Westminster has little influence in security policy. Yet this case also resembles instances of parliamentary influence elsewhere and the factors that explain this vote are consistent with other cases. After a brief description of the backdrop to the vote, we establish the theoretical context of parliaments' role in security policy, setting out the general expectation that parliaments are not particularly influential. At the heart of the article we consider -through a consolidation of previous research -factors that facilitate parliamentary influence in security policy and examine the impact they each had in the Syria vote. In concluding, we use this case to suggest directions for future research. Our aim is to explain this particular vote and to advance research and understanding about the role of parliaments in security policy. We ground our analysis of parliamentary influence in a conceptualisation of political dynamics focusing on group and individual actors from a decision-making perspective. From this wide-ranging research, we consolidate and specify several facilitating factors for parliamentary influence in security policy. They include:• Institutional powers of parliament; 8• Public opinion;• Cabinet type;• Intraparty factions; and• Prime Ministerial (PM) leadership style.These factors can, and often do, act together, but here we present the logic of each separately. Furthermore, none are deterministic; there are caveats to the logic of each of them. Following a comparative, general analysis of factors for parliamentary influence in foreign and security policy, we apply these to the Syria vote.

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Section: Parliamentary Influence In Security Policymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Institutional Legal and Constitutional Authoritymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Institutional Legal and Constitutional Authoritymentioning

confidence: 99%

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No, prime minister: explaining the House of Commons’ vote on intervention in Syria

Kaarbo

Kenealy

2015

European Security

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“…Saalfeld (2005) and Raunio and Hix (2000) rely on rational choice approaches, notably informational theories of legislative choice, which were originally developed for the study of the US Congress. Other rational choice perspectives include Orr (2003) and Pahre (1997) . Most studies are not, however, very explicit in the choice of their theoretical assumptions.…”

Section: Determinants Of Parliamentary Responses To Eu Integrationmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Europeanisation of national political systems: Parliaments and executives

Goetz¹,

Meyer‐Sahling²

2008

Living Rev. Euro. Gov.

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This article reviews the by now extensive literature on the Europeanisation of the political systems of the EU-15, with an emphasis on parliaments and executives (i.e., governments and ministerial administrations). The Living Review highlights apparently contradictory effects of integration: de-parlamentarisation vs. re-parlamentarisation; bureaucratisation vs. politicisation; and centralisation vs. diffusion. These diverging assessments of the effects of integration do, in part, reflect diversity in the EU-15; in part, they are, however, also a result of differences in the specification of variables, research designs and theoretical approaches. Work that inquires into patterns of Europeanisation -across institutional domains, countries, regions and time -and which seeks to tackle the 'methodological nationalism' of the Europeanisation literature promises a clearer picture of the institutional consequences of European integration than we possess at present.This review is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial-NoDerivs 2.0 Austria License. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.0/at/

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“…Fearon (1994Fearon ( , 1997, Tarar (2001) and Leventoglu and Tarar (2005) argue that negotiators may create so-called audience costs by escalating a conflict. Most relevant, however, are the studies by Mo (1994) and Pahre (1997), which allow for endogenous domestic institutions.…”

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confidence: 99%

European Integration, Intergovernmental Bargaining, and Convergence of Party Programmes

Dorussen

Nanou

2006

European Union Politics

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Over the past 50 years, the European Union (EU) has dramatically increased its policy-making power. However, there remains considerable variation over time as well as across policy areas in the relative power of the EU and the member states. The variation is likely to influence EU-wide bargaining. Following the logic of bargaining games with domestically constrained actors, or two-level games, the changes in the bargaining environment may also influence party competition within the member states of the European Union. Using manifesto data for 1951–2001, this article examines convergence of party programmes across Western Europe. It is shown that European integration has increasingly constrained the range of policy platforms. Moreover, we generally find a stronger effect if and when countries are actually members of the EU. European integration bolsters programmatic convergence of Euro-friendly as well as Eurosceptic parties. However, European integration particularly influences the convergence of Eurosceptic parties in EU member states

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Endogenous Domestic Institutions in Two-Level Games and Parliamentary Oversight of the European Union

Cited by 112 publications

References 24 publications

No, prime minister: explaining the House of Commons’ vote on intervention in Syria

No, prime minister: explaining the House of Commons’ vote on intervention in Syria

The Europeanisation of national political systems: Parliaments and executives

European Integration, Intergovernmental Bargaining, and Convergence of Party Programmes

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