Enforcement of Contribution Norms in Public Good Games with Heterogeneous Populations

Abstract

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Promoting cooperation in nonlinear social dilemmas through peer punishment

“…This also makes the equilibria, and the (interior) social-optimum, more challenging to identify, so the levels of free riding and cooperation are less transparent. Consequently, enforcing social norms of cooperation through peer punishment may become more demanding (Reuben and Riedl, 2013). 5 This CPR environment also creates a more challenging setting for cooperation since the payoff gains to deviating from a cooperative allocation are greater, and the ability of a subgroup of agents to gain from mutual cooperation are weaker, compared to the VCM environment.…”

Third-party sanctioning and compensation behavior: Findings from the ultimatum game

“…Consensus and compliance may thus differ. While observed behavior remains a crucial measure of compliance with elicited norms, recent experimental work has introduced the explicit use of questionnaires to assess normative consensus (Bicchieri & Chavez, 2010;Bicchieri, Xiao, & Muldoon, 2011;Krupka & Weber, 2013;Rauhut &Winter, 2010;Reuben & Riedl, 2013). In this paper, we therefore measure both the beliefs and behavior of third parties who tradeoff sanctioning, compensating, and rewarding in response to the violation of or compliance with a social norm.…”

Evolution of altruistic punishment in heterogeneous populations

“…In practice, the amount invested in the public good may be chosen from a continuous range of possibilities, depending on individual abilities. Empirical research has shown that human subjects readily accept individual differences and adjust their expectations, punishing only when they believe their co-players invested less than their fair share [28,29]. In our models, we have shown that a sense of "fairness" does seem to emerge in the spatial model, in the sense that punishment is carried out by individuals that are best suited for the task.…”

“…By allowing the costs and benefits of cooperation to vary across sub-classes, individuals from different classes may have different opportunities. Empirical research shows that differences in marginal benefit from contributions to a public good changes the willingness to contribute and punish [28,29]. Subjects that enjoy a higher benefit not only tend to contribute more to the public good, but are also expected to do so, and are punished more severely by other players if they contribute less than their fair share.…”