Enforcing international environmental cooperation: Technological standards can help

Urpelainen, Johannes

doi:10.1007/s11558-010-9086-1

Cited by 24 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 66 publications

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“…Addressing climate change requires costly cooperation since countries have to reduce energy consumption and adopt new technologies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (Babiker 2005;Urpelainen 2010). While the costs remain ultimately private, the gains from cooperation are public and arise from the collective benefits due to reduced emissions in the form of preserved natural resources and, in the long-run, a stable climate with less frequent and less severe natural disasters.…”

Section: The Foundations Of Support For Global Climate Policy: Intementioning

confidence: 99%

Interests, Norms and Support for the Provision of Global Public Goods: The Case of Climate Co-operation

Bechtel¹,

Genovese²,

Scheve³

2017

Brit. J. Polit. Sci.

112

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Mitigating climate change requires countries to provide a global public good. This means that the domestic cleavages underlying mass attitudes toward international climate policy are a central determinant of its provision. We argue that the industry-specific costs of emission abatement and internalized social norms help explain support for climate policy. To evaluate our predictions we develop novel measures of industry-specific interests by cross-referencing individuals' sectors of employment and objective industry-level pollution data and employing quasi-behavioral measures of social norms in combination with both correlational and conjoint-experimental data. We find that individuals working in pollutive industries are 7 percentage points less likely to support climate cooperation than individuals employed in cleaner sectors. Our results also suggest that reciprocal and altruistic individuals are about 10 percentage points more supportive of global climate policy. These findings indicate that both interests and norms function as complementary explanations that improve our understanding of individual policy preferences.

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Section: The Foundations Of Support For Global Climate Policy: Intementioning

confidence: 99%

Interests, Norms and Support for the Provision of Global Public Goods: The Case of Climate Co-operation

Bechtel¹,

Genovese²,

Scheve³

2017

Brit. J. Polit. Sci.

112

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“…Treaty compliance debates initially tended to view enforcement and capacity-based explanations as competing, and even conflicting, mechanisms (Chayes and Chayes 1995;Downs et al 1996). More recently, scholars have taken a more pragmatic approach, emphasizing that enforcement and capacity can affect compliance simultaneously; they may in fact be mutually reinforcing (Tallberg 2002;Urpelainen 2010;Thompson 2012). The EU's compliance system, for instance, relies on mechanisms that improve capacity and on mechanisms that detect and, when necessary, 'punish' violations (Montoya 2008;Börzel et al 2012).…”

Section: Compliance As a Problem Of Capacity/managementmentioning

confidence: 99%

Compliance With International Law

Stein¹

2017

Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies

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If there is no authority higher than the state, why do governments ever abide by the pacts they make with each other? For some, the answer is simple: states only respect agreements that fulfill their immediate interests. Others are more optimistic. Some view compliance as a problem of enforcement, arguing that international inducements, reciprocity, concerns about reputation, and/or domestic politics/institutions regularly help sustain adherence. Others perceive compliance as a problem of capacity, or of poor management. Seen from this angle, mechanisms that “punish” through enforcement typically make matters worse; instead, treaties need to be transparent, as well as providing technical/financial assistance and solid dispute resolution. Still others emphasize the impact of social context, identity, and/or legitimacy. Governments keep their promises because they care how others perceive them, internalize norms, or view agreements as valid and fair. This article provides an overview of these perspectives, with a strong emphasis on recent developments, including findings from recent survey experiments.

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“…A burgeoning literature on international unions mostly focuses on welfare maximization (Alesina, Angeloni, and Etro 2005;Barberà and Jackson 2006), while the literature on institutional contracting in international politics emphasizes the functionalist benefits of reduced transaction costs (Lake 1996;Weber 2002;Cooley and Spruyt 2009) and the importance of enforcement (Maggi and Morelli 2006;Urpelainen 2010). A burgeoning literature on international unions mostly focuses on welfare maximization (Alesina, Angeloni, and Etro 2005;Barberà and Jackson 2006), while the literature on institutional contracting in international politics emphasizes the functionalist benefits of reduced transaction costs (Lake 1996;Weber 2002;Cooley and Spruyt 2009) and the importance of enforcement (Maggi and Morelli 2006;Urpelainen 2010).…”

Section: International Cooperation and Uncertainty About Ex Post Outsmentioning

confidence: 99%

How uncertainty about outside options impedes international cooperation

Urpelainen

2012

Int Theory

Self Cite

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International cooperation often requires costly policy adjustments. States may worry, however, that such adjustments weaken their outside options, and thus reduce their bargaining power. How does uncertainty about the effects of policy adjustments on outside options influence the depth of cooperation that states can achieve? My game-theoretic analysis shows that uncertainty about outside options is an obstacle to deep cooperation. If states agree on deep cooperation, they have to compensate vulnerable states with weak outside options for their losses. Under uncertainty, states that are not vulnerable have an incentive to falsely claim that they are vulnerable (i) to avoid a side payment or (ii) to obtain compensation for being vulnerable. The result holds even if the added value of deep cooperation would be large enough to fully compensate the losers. In equilibrium, the more vulnerable state sometimes offers a side payment to the less vulnerable one. More broadly, the analysis reveals a new international cooperation problem and provides a new rationale for costly signaling mechanisms and delegation to international organizations.

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Enforcing international environmental cooperation: Technological standards can help

Abstract: Market-based environmental policies, such as emissions trading or pollution taxes, are less costly than command-and-control regulation.

Cited by 24 publications

References 66 publications

Interests, Norms and Support for the Provision of Global Public Goods: The Case of Climate Co-operation

Interests, Norms and Support for the Provision of Global Public Goods: The Case of Climate Co-operation

Compliance With International Law

How uncertainty about outside options impedes international cooperation

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