Enhancing genetic virtue: A project for twenty-first century humanity?

Walker, Mark

doi:10.2990/28_2_27

Cited by 51 publications

(26 citation statements)

References 51 publications

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“…We have to be fully aware of the fact that the human mind is not made up of isolated capacities or traits. Although focusing on moral virtues [17,18] could potentially provide a more holistic approach to moral enhancement, it may lack a sufficient focus on the motivational processes required for moral decision making and behavior. It may also prove extremely difficult to relate general traits such as specific 'virtues' (e.g., empathy) to neurobiological and/or genetic correlates [19].…”

Section: Defining Moral Enhancementmentioning

confidence: 99%

Moral Enhancement: Do Means Matter Morally?

Focquaert

Schermer²

2015

Neuroethics

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One of the reasons why moral enhancement may be controversial, is because the advantages of moral enhancement may fall upon society rather than on those who are enhanced. If directed at individuals with certain counter-moral traits it may have direct societal benefits by lowering immoral behavior and increasing public safety, but it is not directly clear if this also benefits the individual in question. In this paper, we will discuss what we consider to be moral enhancement, how different means may be used to achieve it and whether the means we employ to reach moral enhancement matter morally. Are certain means to achieve moral enhancement wrong in themselves? Are certain means to achieve moral enhancement better than others, and if so, why? More specifically, we will investigate whether the difference between direct and indirect moral enhancement matters morally. Is it the case that indirect means are morally preferable to direct means of moral enhancement and can we indeed pinpoint relevant intrinsic, moral differences between both? We argue that the distinction between direct and indirect means is indeed morally relevant, but only insofar as it tracks an underlying distinction between active and passive interventions. Although passive interventions can be ethical provided specific safeguards are put in place, these interventions exhibit a greater potential to compromise autonomy and disrupt identity.

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Section: Defining Moral Enhancementmentioning

confidence: 99%

Moral Enhancement: Do Means Matter Morally?

Focquaert

Schermer²

2015

Neuroethics

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“…For example, Sparrow suggests that imposing moral enhancements on others might, even if benevolently motivated, constitute an objectionable form of domination (forthcoming; under review; see also Bublitz and Merkel 2009). Meanwhile Walker (2009) and Blackford (2010) have responded to similar concerns as they might be raised in relation to the imposition of MDNs on one's children or children-to-be.…”

Section: Further Questionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, some of the same issues arise in cases of selection as in cases of neuroenhancement discussed here, and there is some literature exploring these. For example, Faust (2008) argues that if parents were able to select for morally desirable traits in their future children it would be desirable, and probably obligatory, for them to do so, and Walker (2009) argues that principled reason not to select for moral virtues in one's children, unless there is a principled reason not to engage in selection at all. 3 For criticism of these claims, see Agar (2010), Andreadis (2010), Arnhart (2010) and Bronstein (2010).…”

Section: Further Questionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Morality of Moral Neuroenhancement

Douglas

2014

Handbook of Neuroethics

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Abstract. This chapter reviews recent philosophical and neuroethical literature on the morality of moral neuroenhancements. It first briefly outlines the main moral arguments that have been made concerning moral status neuroenhancements. These are neurointerventions that would augment the moral status of human persons. It then surveys recent debate regarding moral desirability neuroenhancements: neurointerventions that augment that the moral desirability of human character traits, motives or conduct. This debate has contested, among other claims (i) Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu's contention that there is a moral imperative to pursue the development of moral desirability neuroenhancements, (ii) Thomas Douglas' claim that voluntarily undergoing moral desirability neuroenhancements would often be morally permissible, and (iii) David DeGrazia's claim that moral desirability neuroenhancements would often be morally desirable. The chapter discusses a number of concerns that have been raised regarding moral desirability neuroenhancements, including concerns that they would restrict freedom, would produce only a superficial kind of moral improvement, would rely on technologies that are liable to be misused, and would frequently misfire, resulting in moral deterioration rather than moral improvement.

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“…7.For discussion of the other-regarding reasons bearing on selection decisions, see Faust 2008, Walker 2009, Douglas et al 2010, and Elster 2011.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Procreative Altruism: Beyond Individualism in Reproductive Selection

Douglas¹,

Devolder²

2013

Journal of Medicine and Philosophy

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Existing debate on procreative selection focuses on the well-being of the future child. However, selection decisions can also have significant effects on the well-being of others. Moreover, these effects may run in opposing directions; some traits conducive to the well-being of the selected child may be harmful to others, whereas other traits that limit the child’s well-being may preserve or increase that of others. Prominent selection principles defended to date instruct parents to select a child, of the possible children they could have, likely to have a good (or nonbad) life, but they do not instruct parents to independently take the well-being of others into account. We refer to these principles as individualistic selection principles. We propose a new selection principle—Procreative Altruism—according to which parents have significant moral reason to select a child whose existence can be expected to contribute more to (or detract less from) the well-being of others than any alternative child they could have. We present the case for adopting Procreative Altruism alongside any of the major individualistic selection principles proposed to date and defend this two-principle model against a range of objections.

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Enhancing genetic virtue: A project for twenty-first century humanity?

Cited by 51 publications

References 51 publications

Moral Enhancement: Do Means Matter Morally?

Moral Enhancement: Do Means Matter Morally?

The Morality of Moral Neuroenhancement

Procreative Altruism: Beyond Individualism in Reproductive Selection

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