Enough and as Good: A Formal Model of Lockean First Appropriation

Kogelmann, Brian; Ogden, Benjamin

doi:10.1111/ajps.12369

Cited by 13 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…Brian Kogelmann and Benjamin Ogden (2018) develop a formal model to shed light on this question. Using a general equilibrium framework, they compare an institutional rule where households may appropriate as much land as they like to an institutional rule where households can only appropriate a prespecified amount of land.…”

Section: Institutional Designmentioning

confidence: 99%

Formal models in normative political theory

Chung,

Kogelmann

2024

Journal of Theoretical Politics

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This article revisits the conventional distinction in political science between ‘positive’ and ‘normative’ political theory, particularly the belief that formal and mathematical methods are only pertinent to positive political theory. We argue that formal models are equally valuable in normative political theory for three reasons: they can make thought experiments more rigorous, they can demonstrate the consistency of normative principles, and they can provide insights into the practical workings of novel institutional arrangements in the absence of empirical data. The integration of formal models into normative political theory presents challenges, including the development of criteria for evaluating these models and potential shifts in research focus. Integration can also strengthen political theory’s tenuous role in the political science discipline.

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Section: Institutional Designmentioning

confidence: 99%

Formal models in normative political theory

Chung,

Kogelmann

2024

Journal of Theoretical Politics

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“…Further assumptions about what makes agents prefer one thing to another should be considered as auxiliary assumptions, the empirical adequacy of which should be ascertained on independent grounds. Consequently, those seeking to model political ignorance as rational need not commit themselves to the claim that agents choose to remain ignorant on the 14 It is notable-and admittedly controversial-that this way of characterizing rationality effectively makes rational choice a "theory of preference maximization" (Kogelmann and Gaus, 2017). It takes for granted an agent's preferences, construing rationality as about, inter alia, always choosing the most preferred option from among a set of alternatives, and so on.…”

Section: Rethinking Rational Political Ignorancementioning

confidence: 99%

Political ignorance is both rational and radical

Gibbons

2023

Synthese

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It is commonly held that political ignorance is rational, a response to the high costs and low benefits of acquiring political information. But many recent critics of the claim that political ignorance is rational instead urge that it is a simple consequence of agents not concerning themselves with the acquisition of political information whatsoever. According to such critics, political ignorance is inadvertent radical ignorance rather than a rational response to the incentives faced by agents in democracies. And since political ignorance is not a response to incentives, these critics urge, it cannot be ameliorated by incentivizing the acquisition of political information. This paper has two goals. First, I show that these seemingly competing accounts of political ignorance are in fact complementary, together explaining much political ignorance. Indeed, there is a sense in which political ignorance can be both rational and radical at the same time. Second, I more closely examine the relationship between incentives, kinds of political ignorance, and the acquisition of political information. On the one hand, from the fact that political ignorance is rational it does not follow that it can be overcome by incentivizing the acquisition of information.On the other hand, from the fact that political ignorance is radical it does not follow that it cannot be overcome by incentivizing the acquisition of information. Lastly, the complexity of the information in question is more relevant to determining whether ignorance can be overcome than whether such ignorance is rational or radical.

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“… 3. In doing so, this paper contributes to a growing literature that analyzes Locke’s political theory using the tools of modern economics (e.g., Barrett, 2020; Bruner, 2020; Chung, 2020; Kogelmann and Ogden, 2018; Van der Vossen, forthcoming). …”

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confidence: 99%

Lockeans against labor mixing

Kogelmann

2021

Politics, Philosophy & Economics

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The idea that labor mixing confers property in unowned resources is, for many, the very heart of the Lockean system of property. In this essay I shall argue that this common view is mistaken. Lockean theorists should reject labor mixing as the preferred method of first appropriation, and should adopt a different account of first appropriation instead. This is because labor mixing does not serve the central justification for the institution of property embraced by Lockeans. Thus, my argument is internal to the Lockean system; I rely only on premises that (many) Lockean theorists embrace. Though Lockeans should forsake labor mixing, that does not mean they should give up on property rights and the idea of first appropriation. In the paper’s final section, I sketch an account of first appropriation that Lockeans should embrace.

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Enough and as Good: A Formal Model of Lockean First Appropriation

Cited by 13 publications

References 22 publications

Formal models in normative political theory

Formal models in normative political theory

Political ignorance is both rational and radical

Lockeans against labor mixing

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