Ensuring compliance with NRMP policy

Pearson, Rebecca; Innes, A H

doi:10.1097/00001888-199907000-00001

Cited by 7 publications

(4 citation statements)

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“…Interestingly, although the medical matches attempt to prevent employers from asking for early commitments, or requesting information on how applicants will rank them in the match, medical matches are plagued with instances of requests for commitment and informal rankings. For example, Pearson and Innes (1999) reported that 15% of 1996 and 1997 graduates of the University of Virginia School of Medicine were asked for signals concerning what rank order list they intended to submit to the centralized match. Other surveys confirm this finding, and also that many medical students when confronted with such questions, answer deceptively (Anderson et al, 1999;Carek et al, 2000;Teichman et al, 2000).…”

Section: Article In Pressmentioning

confidence: 99%

The dynamics of law clerk matching: An experimental and computational investigation of proposals for reform of the market

Haruvy

Roth

Ünver

2006

Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control

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Section: Article In Pressmentioning

confidence: 99%

The dynamics of law clerk matching: An experimental and computational investigation of proposals for reform of the market

Haruvy

Roth

Ünver

2006

Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control

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“…Surveys of medical students reveal that when they are nevertheless asked for such indications and commitments, they feel free to answer encouragingly, without constraining their subsequent behavior in the match (see e.g. Anderson et al, 1999;Carek et al, 2000;Pearson and Innes, 1999;Teichman et al, 2000). In the medical resident market, like the graduate admissions market, the rules of the market and the corresponding market culture result in current operations of those markets in which early matches seem not to be very common.…”

Section: Graduate and Undergraduate Admissionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Market Culture: How Norms Governing Exploding Offers Affect Market Performance

Niederle¹,

Roth²

2004

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Many markets have organizations that influence or try to establish norms concerning when offers can be made, accepted and rejected. Examining a dozen previously studied markets suggests that markets in which transactions are made far in advance are markets in which it is acceptable for firms to make exploding offers, and unacceptable for workers to renege on commitments they make, however early. But this evidence is only suggestive, because the markets differ in many ways other than norms concerning offers. Laboratory experiments allow us to isolate the effects of exploding offers and binding acceptances. In a simple environment, in which uncertainty about applicants' quality is resolved over time, we find inefficient early contracting when firms can make exploding offers and applicants' acceptances are binding. Relaxing either of these two conditions causes matching to take place later, when more information about applicants' qualities is available, and consequently results in higher efficiency and fewer blocking pairs. This suggests that elements of market culture may play an important role in influencing market performance.

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“…Previous publications suggest that violations of professional behavior in the match process may be common 3–11. However, the frequency of misleading communications is unknown.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

367: Emergency Medicine Residency Applicants’ Perceptions About Being Contacted After Interview Day

Yarris

Deiorio

Andrus

2007

Annals of Emergency Medicine

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ObjectiveWe sought to characterize the experiences and preferences of applicants to emergency medicine (EM) residency programs about being contacted by programs after their interview day but before the rank list submission deadline.MethodsThis cross-sectional study surveyed all applicants to an academic EM residency during the 2006–2007 interview cycle. Participation was anonymous and voluntary. We used a Web-based survey software program to administer the survey in February 2007, after rank lists were submitted. Two additional invitations to participate were sent over the next month. The instrument contained multiple-choice and free-text items. This study was submitted to our Institutional Review Board and was exempt from formal review.Results240/706 (34%) of applicants completed the survey. 89% (214/240) of respondents reported being contacted by a residency program after their interview but before rank lists were due. Of those contacted, 91% report being contacted by e-mail; 67% by mail; and 55% by phone. 51% of subjects reported that being contacted changed the order of their rank list in at least one case. A majority of contacted applicants felt “happy” (58%) or “excited” (56%) about being contacted, but significant numbers reported feeling “put on the spot” (21%) or “uncomfortable” (17%).A majority felt that it is appropriate for programs to contact applicants after interview day but before the rank lists are submitted, but 39% of contacted subjects responded that contact by phone is either “always inappropriate” or “usually inappropriate.” Regarding perceptions regarding the rules of the match, 80% (165/206) of respondents felt it was appropriate to tell programs where they would be ranked, and 41% (85/206) felt it was appropriate for programs to notify applicants of their place on the program’s rank list.ConclusionMost EM residency applicants report being contacted by programs after the interview day but before rank lists are submitted. Although applicants feel this practice is appropriate in general, over a third of subjects feel that contact by phone is inappropriate. These findings suggest that residency programs can expect a majority of their applicants to be contacted after an interview at another program, and shed light on how applicants perceive this practice.

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Ensuring compliance with NRMP policy

Cited by 7 publications

References 0 publications

The dynamics of law clerk matching: An experimental and computational investigation of proposals for reform of the market

The dynamics of law clerk matching: An experimental and computational investigation of proposals for reform of the market

Market Culture: How Norms Governing Exploding Offers Affect Market Performance

367: Emergency Medicine Residency Applicants’ Perceptions About Being Contacted After Interview Day

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