2013
DOI: 10.1017/epi.2013.46
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Entitlement and Mutually Recognized Reasonable Disagreement

Abstract: Most people not only think that it is possible for reasonable people to disagree, but that it is possible for people to recognize that they are parties to a reasonable disagreement. The aim of this paper is to explain how such mutually recognized reasonable disagreements are possible. I appeal to an “entitlement claim” which implies a form of relativism about reasonable belief, based on the idea that whether a belief is reasonable for a person can depend on the fact that she has inherited a particular worldvie… Show more

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Cited by 24 publications
(51 citation statements)
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“…I discuss the doxastic value of hope in Pasnau (forthcoming-b). For a recent attempt to account for this sort of trust in the context of disagreement, see Hazlett (2014), though his proposal is quite different from my own, because he attempts to defend the epistemic rationality of such practices. Disagreement and the value of self-trust 2319…”
Section: Self-trust and Other Doxastic Valuesmentioning
confidence: 90%
“…I discuss the doxastic value of hope in Pasnau (forthcoming-b). For a recent attempt to account for this sort of trust in the context of disagreement, see Hazlett (2014), though his proposal is quite different from my own, because he attempts to defend the epistemic rationality of such practices. Disagreement and the value of self-trust 2319…”
Section: Self-trust and Other Doxastic Valuesmentioning
confidence: 90%
“…The properties are: consistency, noncircularity, rational acceptability, and enabling criticism. The objections 3 Faultless disagreement is well established as a motivator for semantic relativism (Kölbel 2004 andMacFarlane 2007 andWright 2012;see also Hales 1997;Kinzel and Kusch 2018), and peer disagreement has been used to support epistemic relativism (Hazlett 2014;. 4 For a detailed-and eye-opening-account of intellectual arrogance, see Tanesini 2016.…”
Section: Categorising Objections and Repliesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…4 For a detailed-and eye-opening-account of intellectual arrogance, see Tanesini 2016. 5 For more on intellectual humility, see Roberts and Wood 2003;Hazlett 2012;Christen, Alfano, and Robinson 2014;and Whitcomb et al 2017.…”
Section: Categorising Objections and Repliesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This is default entitlement ” (Williams, , p. 358; emphasis added). In the same vein, Alan Hazlett remarks that “[e]ntitlement, for Wright, involves non‐evidential permission to believe: I am permitted to believe that p despite lacking evidence that p ” (Hazlett, , p. 6; emphasis added). Thus understood, deontological justification and entitlement come very close to each other on the epistemic scale, diminishing the threat of leaching to a considerable extent .…”
Section: Deontological Justification and Conservatism: Deontological mentioning
confidence: 99%