Crispin Wright has advanced a number of arguments to show that, in addition to evidential warrant, we have a species of non-evidential warrant, namely, "entitlement", which forms the basis of a particular view of the architecture of perceptual justification known as "epistemic conservatism". It is widely known, however, that Wright's conservative view is beset by a number of problems. In this article, I shall argue that the kind of warrant that emerges from Wright's account is not the standard truth-conducive justification, but what is known as the deontological conception of justification. It will be argued that the deontological justification has features that make it a better candidate for representing a conservative architecture. These results will be reinforced by showing how the deontological framework can make better sense of a recent theory of justified (reasonable) belief that takes its inspiration from Wright's conservative account. Thus understood, we may see the liberalism-conservatism controversy as actually an extension of the older debate over which conception of justification, truth-conducive or deontological, can best represent the epistemic status of our belief-forming practices.1 There is a huge debate in the philosophy of perception (e.g., Siegel, 2010) about whether perceptual experiences can represent "high-level" properties such as kinds (of objects) or merely "low-level" properties such as colour, shape, etc. For the sake of discussion, I am assuming the former, rich content, view. But my arguments can equally go through if the latter view is adopted.