Environmental Agency and Public Opinion in Guangzhou: The Limits of a Popular Approach to Environmental Governance

Abstract

Researchers on China's environmental governance have usually maintained that the inferior bureaucratic status of the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) (formerly the National Environmental Protection Agency) and its local agencies have accounted for the limited enforcement of environmental regulations in China. Environmental agencies at all levels have found it difficult to obtain active support and co-operation from other bureaucratic authorities in charge of economic development to take a tough stand on tackling environmental problems. Strong and influential government agencies such as planning commissions (jiwei), economic commissions (jingwei), construction commissions (jianwei), and industrial and commercial authorities are known to be reluctant to endorse and enforce stringent environmental measures for fear that they might slow down economic growth. With a strong pro-growth orientation, both central and local governments have usually sided with these economic bureaus and have subordinated environmental protection to economic interests when the two have been in conflict.

Enforcement Styles Among Environmental Protection Officials in China

“…To win the support of the public and local people's congress, the GEPB has made substantial efforts to propagate environmental values, arouse popular concerns concerning local environmental problems, handle pollution complaints, and convey people's grievances about environmental concerns to the municipal government. Unfortunately, strong bureaucratic resistance to greater involvement by the public in environmental governance persists inside Guangzhou's bureaucracy (Lo and Leung, 2000).…”

“…Moreover, it was found that the press in coastal cities are relatively more open than in other areas of the country; for example, local newspapers in Shanghai and Guangzhou (Lo and Yip, 1999;Lo and Leung, 2000) have been particularly aggressive in disclosing serious cases of environmental violations. In addition, EPBs have begun to publish annual reports of their work in an effort to draw popular attention to pollution problems (Lo and Leung, 2000). Thus, the degree to which the public is informed about environmental problems, although uneven, has generally increased, as has the importance of public support for environmental protection.…”

“…There should be little question that this broad assertion is applicable in China, where the politics of regulation takes place mainly inside the local bureaucracy and can be shaped by exceptionally diverse parochial interests (Sinkule and Ortolano, 1995;Tang et al, 1997;Lo and Leung, 2000;Ma and Ortolano, 2000). For environmental regulation in general, at the local level such interests may include: municipal leaders (reflecting the mayor's particular policy priorities), various economic and industrial bureaus (usually favouring economic development over environmental protection), government bureaus (many owning or otherwise sponsoring polluting enterprises), and the environmental agency itself (which must rely almost totally on the collection of fees from the discharge of pollutants and other local sources to finance its operations).…”

“…Although much has been written about regulatory enforcement in China (e.g., Chan, Wong, Lo and Cheung, 1995;Sinkule and Ortolano, 1995;Sims, 1999;Lo and Leung, 2000;Ma and Ortolano, 2000), two factors have been largely overlooked in the discussion on how to improve China's environment. First, most studies have focused on the policy-or organization-level, thereby overlooking the enforcement officials themselves.…”

A structural analysis of green supply chain management enablers in the UAE construction sector

“…The study identified green purchasing behaviour of customers is more in developed countries than in developing countries. Lo and Leung (2000) identified the increasing environmental awareness of young customers. Eltayeb and Zailani (2010) identified consumer pressure as an important driver in reverse logistics.…”