Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Discounting of Human Lives

Revesz, Richard L.

doi:10.2307/1123481

Cited by 135 publications

(64 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Based on these differences, Revesz (1999) and Rowlatt et al (1998) predict a higher WTP for reductions in mortality risk in the case of air pollution than for similar risk reductions in the case of road safety. 3 Cookson (2000) confirms the importance and negative effect of voluntariness and locus of control on stated WTP based on focus group discussions related to prioritizing and valuing risk reductions in six policy contexts.…”

Section: Existing Empirical Evidencementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Reviews by Rowlatt et al (1998) and Revesz (1999) propose adjustment factors for transferring VSL estimates from road safety to air pollution, based on context specific risk characteristics such as voluntariness, control and responsibility, and related age, latency and health status effects. Although both reviews predict a higher VSL in the air pollution context compared to road safety, empirical evidence of such a context effect is limited and mixed in primary valuation studies (e.g.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

The Effect of Risk Context on the Value of a Statistical Life: a Bayesian Meta-model

Dekker

Brouwer

Hofkes

et al. 2011

Environ Resource Econ

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper presents the first value of statistical life (VSL) meta-analysis that empirically estimates correction factors for 'out of context' benefits transfer (BT) purposes. In the field of mortality risk reductions elicited willingness to pay values in one risk context, say road safety, are frequently applied in other risk contexts like air pollution. However, differences in risk perception and the population at risk across contexts are likely to result in diverging VSL estimates. In a meta-analysis of 26 international stated preference studies, a Bayesian model is estimated regressing contingent values for mortality risk reductions, originating from three different risk contexts, on the characteristics of the risk reduction itself and additional variables characterizing the underlying studies. A willingness to pay (WTP) premium for mortality risk reductions in the air pollution and general mortality risk context relative to improving road safety is observed. Evaluated at the mean, road safety VSL estimates should be multiplied by a factor 1.8 before being applicable in the air pollution context. Moreover, in an illustrative BT exercise we find limited overlap in the set of context specific predictive VSL distributions. Consequently, 'out of context' BT results in a substantial overor underestimation of the VSL.

show abstract

Section: Existing Empirical Evidencementioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Effect of Risk Context on the Value of a Statistical Life: a Bayesian Meta-model

Dekker

Brouwer

Hofkes

et al. 2011

Environ Resource Econ

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Moral framing has been demonstrated in the important context of obligations to future generations (see Frederick 2003), a much-disputed question of morality, politics, and law (Morrison 1998;Revesz 1999). To say the least, the appropriate discount rate for those yet to be born is not a question that most people have pondered, and hence their judgments are highly susceptible to different frames.…”

Section: The Asian Disease Problem and Moral Framingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Certainly, the speaker's choice might offer a clue about the desired response; some subjects in the Asian disease problem might be responding to that clue. But even if people are generally taking account of the speaker's clues, 2 that claim is consistent with the proposition that frames matter a great deal to moral intuitions, which is all I am stressing here.Moral framing has been demonstrated in the important context of obligations to future generations (see Frederick 2003), a much-disputed question of morality, politics, and law (Morrison 1998;Revesz 1999). To say the least, the appropriate discount rate for those yet to be born is not a question that most people have pondered, and hence their judgments are highly susceptible to different frames.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

what's in a heuristic?

Hahn¹,

Frost²,

Maio³

2005

Behav Brain Sci

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

With respect to questions of fact, people use heuristics -mental short-cuts, or rules of thumb, that generally work well, but that also lead to systematic errors. People use moral heuristics too -moral short-cuts, or rules of thumb, that lead to mistaken and even absurd moral judgments. These judgments are highly relevant not only to morality, but to law and politics as well. Examples are given from a number of domains, including risk regulation, punishment, reproduction and sexuality, and the act/omission distinction. In all of these contexts, rapid, intuitive judgments make a great deal of sense, but sometimes produce moral mistakes that are replicated in law and policy. One implication is that moral assessments ought not to be made by appealing to intuitions about exotic cases and problems; those intuitions are particularly unlikely to be reliable. Another implication is that some deeply held moral judgments are unsound if they are products of moral heuristics. The idea of error-prone heuristics is especially controversial in the moral domain, where agreement on the correct answer may be hard to elicit; but in many contexts, heuristics are at work and they do real damage. Moral framing effects, including those in the context of obligations to future generations, are also discussed.Cass R. Sunstein is Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor, Law School and Department of Political Science, University of Chicago. His many books include Laws of Fear (2005), Why Societies Need Dissent (2003), and Risk and Reason (2002). Much of his research explores the intersection of psychology, economics, and law; he has been particularly interested in the role of cognitive errors and social influences on juries, legislators, judges, and those who are the objects of law's commands. He is now working on a book on the production of social knowledge, with special reference to information aggregation across persons.that some of our deeply held moral beliefs might be products of heuristics that sometimes produce mistakes.If moral heuristics are in fact pervasive, then people with diverse foundational commitments should be able to agree, not that their own preferred theories are wrong, but that they are often applied in a way that reflects the use of heuristics. Utilitarians ought to be able to identify heuristics for the maximization of utility; deontologists should be able to point to heuristics for the proper discharge of moral responsibilities; and those uncommitted to any large-scale theory should be able to specify heuristics for their own more modest normative commitments. And if moral heuristics exist, blunders are highly likely not only in moral thinking, but in legal and political practice as well. Conventional legal and political arguments are often a product of heuristics masquerading as universal truths. Hence, I will identify a set of political and legal judgments that are best understood as a product of heuristics, and that are often taken, wrongly and damagingly, as a guide to political and legal p...

show abstract

“…Cancer is associated with suffering and pain, and is highly dreaded (Starr, 1969;Fischhoff et al, 1978;Slovic, 1987), and some observers have suggested that the VSL should be greater when the cause of death is cancer (Revesz, 1999;US EPA 2000). This is sometimes referred to as "cancer premium."…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The benefits of avoiding cancer (or dying from cancer): Evidence from a four- country study

Alberini

Ščasný

2018

Journal of Health Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract. We use stated-preference methods to estimate the cancer Value per Statistical Life (VSL) and Value per Statistical Case (VSCC) from a representative sample of 45-60-year olds in four countries in Europe. We ask respondents to report information about their willingness to pay for health risk reductions that are different from those used in earlier valuation work because they are comprised of two probabilities-that of getting cancer, and that of dying from it (conditional on getting it in the first place). The product of these two probabilities is the unconditional cancer mortality risk. Our hypothetical risk reductions also include two qualitative attributes-quality-of-life impacts and pain. The results show that respondents did appear to have an intuitive grasp of compound probabilities, and took into account each component of the unconditional cancer mortality risk when answering the valuation questions. We estimate the cancer VSL to be between € 1.9 and 5.7 million, depending on whether the (unconditional) mortality risk was reduced by lowering the chance of getting cancer, increasing the chance of surviving cancer, or both. The VSCC is estimated to be up to € 0.550 million euro, and its magnitude depends on the initial (conditional) cancer mortality and on the improvement in survival. We interpret these as "pure" mortality and cancer risk values, stripped of morbidity, pain or quality-of-life effects. The survey responses show that impacts on daily activities and pain have little or no effect on the WTP to reduce the adverse health risks.

show abstract

Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Discounting of Human Lives

Cited by 135 publications

References 0 publications

The Effect of Risk Context on the Value of a Statistical Life: a Bayesian Meta-model

The Effect of Risk Context on the Value of a Statistical Life: a Bayesian Meta-model

what's in a heuristic?

The benefits of avoiding cancer (or dying from cancer): Evidence from a four- country study

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About