Environmental Technological Choice in a Cournot-Bertrand Model

Asproudis, Elias; Filippiadis, Eleftherios

doi:10.1007/s10842-020-00339-z

Cited by 5 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 18 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Semenov and Tondji (2019) studied the role of a Cournot-Bertrand market on firms' investment in R&D and found that the firm as a quantity-setter invests more in cost-reduction than the firm as a price-setter. Asproudis and Filippiadis (2021) found that a Cournot firm generally chooses the technology that is more environmental-friendly than a Bertrand firm. Unfortunately, these papers ignore the vertical relationship between the input suppliers and downstream firms under technology licensing, which is quite common in reality.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mixed competition and technology licensing in a supply chain

Zhang

Zhou

2022

Front. Psychol.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Technology licensing as a vital part of business behavior in many industries has drawn a fair amount of attention in industrial organization literature. Most existing literature on licensing decisions assumes that all firms engage in Cournot or Bertrand competition, while the type of mixed competition may affect the choice of the licensor. In this context, what decision will the licensor make faced with different mixed competitions? This paper studies the optimal technology licensing contract of a licensor firm engaging in different mixed competitions (Cournot-Bertrand or Bertrand-Cournot) with a potential licensee in a differentiated duopoly market considering one upstream firm (supplier) that provides key inputs. We find that if either the royalty or fixed-fee licensing is applied, the licensor favors royalty licensing under Bertrand-Cournot competition when the degree of substitution is small and prefers the fixed-fee licensing no matter under what kind of mixed competition as the degree of substitution increases. In the case of fixed-fee licensing, the result shows that the profits of licensors are the same under different types of mixed competition. Besides, fixed-fee licensing is not always the optimal choice for consumers, and they would prefer royalty licensing when the degree of substitution is very small.

show abstract

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mixed competition and technology licensing in a supply chain

Zhang

Zhou

2022

Front. Psychol.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Semenov and Tondji (2019) study the impact of a Cournot–Bertrand market on firms' decisions to invest in R&D. They find that a Cournot‐type firm invests more in cost‐reduction compared to the Bertrand‐type firm. Asproudis and Filippiadis (2021) find that a Cournot firm commonly chooses a greener technology than a Bertrand firm. These papers demonstrate that a hybrid Cournot–Bertrand market structure has a strong influence on the firms' decisions and performance.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Information sharing in a Cournot–Bertrand duopoly

Kopel

Putz

2021

Manage Decis Econ

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Studies on information sharing in oligopolies focus on either Cournot or Bertrand markets. We consider a Cournot–Bertrand market where owners provide strategic managerial incentives and can share the details of their compensation contracts. We find that the Cournot firm punishes its manager for sales, whereas the Bertrand firm rewards sales. Both firms share contract information if the firms' products are sufficiently differentiated. However, if product differentiation is low, then either the Cournot firm or the Bertrand firm keeps the contract information private. Mandating information sharing can lead to an increase in consumer and social welfare but harms firms' profits.

show abstract

“…Tremblay and Tremblay [5] investigated the effect of product differentiation on the static properties of the Cournot-Bertrand duopoly game, and pointed out that only the Cournot-type firm survives with no differentiation. Asproudis and Filippiadis [18] discussed the abatement technology choice in Cournot-Bertrand, pure Cournot and pure Bertrand duopolies, and demonstrated that the introduction of abatement technologies would increase total output in the market and decrease total emissions. As we can see, most references related to hybrid games are based on perfect rationality.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Stability of equilibrium price-production of dynamic duopoly Bertrand–Cournot game in a transnational supply chain with asymmetric information

Jian-jun¹,

Wang²

2023

Applied Mathematics and Nonlinear Sciences

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Bounded rationality, asymmetric information and foreign trade are widespread in the economic market, and have been studied extensively in oligopoly games, but there are not many works discussing asymmetric information and bounded rationality in the supply chain hybrid game. In contrast with existing works, in our study, we innovatively construct a duopoly Bertrand–Cournot game model in a transnational supply chain with bounded rationality and asymmetric information. It is assumed that upstream firm 1 knows all the market information and adopts boundedly rational expectation, while downstream firm 2 only partially knows the market information and uses naïve expectation. Based on game theory and nonlinear dynamic theory, the complexity of the discrete system is analysed with respect to effective information, shareholding ratio and price sensitivity. Results reveal the following: (i) When the downstream firm knows little about the price information of the upstream firm, the market may be unstable or even chaotic; otherwise, it is conducive to the stability of the product market. (ii) When the shareholding ratio or the price sensitivity is relatively small, the market is more stable, and as they increase, the discrete price-production system goes through bifurcation and eventually falls into chaos. Our research has an important theoretical and practical significance for price-production supply chain competition in oligopoly markets.

show abstract

Environmental Technological Choice in a Cournot-Bertrand Model

Cited by 5 publications

References 18 publications

Mixed competition and technology licensing in a supply chain

Mixed competition and technology licensing in a supply chain

Information sharing in a Cournot–Bertrand duopoly

Stability of equilibrium price-production of dynamic duopoly Bertrand–Cournot game in a transnational supply chain with asymmetric information

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About