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This paper investigates the abatement technology choice in a Cournot-Bertrand duopoly where the regulator has imposed a per unit of emission tax.It is argued that, under certain conditions, the Bertrand …rm will choose a "dirtier" technology compared to its Cournot rival. Moreover, the introduction of abatement technologies will increase total output in the market and decrease total emissions.

We analyse a different timing implementation of environmental regulation and compare the effects on the markets from a policy innovation perspective. The paper addresses the question: Should a regulator try to commit to a policy (ex-ante regulation) or rather adapt its policy to a firm's decisions (ex-post)? The findings are of interest towards improving regulatory effectiveness and economics efficiencies, e.g. for the transatlantic regional relationship between EU and USA. Our findings highlight differences in policy timing between markets may be harmful. The transatlantic regulators should consider the timing of the policy innovation for the achievement of mutual benefits. AbstractWe analyse a different timing implementation of environmental regulation and compare the effects on the markets from a policy innovation perspective. The paper addresses the question: Should a regulator try to commit to a policy (ex-ante regulation) or rather adapt its policy to a firm's decisions (ex-post)? The findings are of interest towards improving regulatory effectiveness and economics efficiencies, e.g. for the transatlantic regional relationship between EU and USA. Our findings highlight differences in policy timing between markets may be harmful. The transatlantic regulators should consider the timing of the policy innovation for the achievement of mutual benefits.

Environmental groups, Motivations, Size, Budget, Impure altruism, D64, D7, H41, L31,