Epistemic and Dialectical Models of Begging the Question

Abstract

This paper addresses the problem posed by the current split between the two opposed hypotheses in the growing literature on the fallacy of begging the question: the epistemic hypothesis, based on knowledge and belief, and the dialectical one, based on formal dialogue systems. In the first section, the nature of split is explained, and it is shown how each hypothesis has developed. To get the beginning reader up to speed in the literature, a number of key problematic examples are analyzed illustrating how both approaches can be applied. Useful tools are brought to bear on them, including the automated argument diagramming system Araucaria, and profiles of dialogue used to represent circular argumentation in a dialogue tableau format. These tools are used to both to model circular reasoning and to provide the contextual evidence needed to properly determine whether the circular reasoning in a given case is better judged fallacious or not. A number of technical problems that have impeded the development of both hypotheses are studied. One central problem is the distinction between argument and explanation. It is concluded that the best way to move forward and solve these problems is to reformulate the two hypotheses in such a way that they might be able to co-exist. On this basis, a unified methodology is proposed that allows each hypothesis to move forward as a legitimate avenue for research using the same tools.[271] Synthese (2006) 152: 237-284 Knowledge, Rationality & Action 271-318

Circularity in ethotic structures

“…it is assumed that this fallacy can be properly represented in a framework of a dialogue, cf. (Walton 2006 The Passerby's information about the route to the Convention Center is analysed as an example of argumentation from position to know. Here, it is assumed that the Tourist may infer a conclusion about how to get to the Convention Center on the basis of the Passerby's assertion (3-b) and the Passerby's credibility (in this case, his position to know).…”

“…One well-known example of ethotic circularity is introduced in (Hamblin, 1970, p. 34) and later analysed in (Walton 2006): (6) a. Manager said, Can you give me a credit reference?…”

“…Next, according to (Walton 2006), not every instance of circular reasoning commits the fallacy of begging the question. Circular reasoning commits the fallacy of begging the question iff it fails to fulfil its function of removing doubt expressed in the conclusion and this function is associated only with argumentation.…”

“…Ethotic begging the question (analysed by, e.g. Hamblin (1970); Walton (2006)) is a fallacy of cyclic argumentation in which a speaker i's credibility is supported by another speaker j's credibility and then j's credibility is supported by i's credibility.…”

Petitio principii and circular argumentation as seen from a theory of dialectical structures

“…Yet, the notions of equivalency and dependency circularity are not coherently defined in the literature. In Walton (2006), for instance, dependency circularity is said to hold iff "the line of reasoning used to support the premise requires the conclusion as a part of the reasoning" (p. 281). In that case, however, dependency circularity would simply reduce to equivalency circularity if the supporting argumentation were explicitly reconstructed.…”