Epistemic contextualism defended

Abstract

Epistemic contextualists think that the extension of the expression 'knows' (and its cognates) depends on and varies with the context of utterance. In the last 15 years or so this view has faced intense criticism. This paper focuses on two sorts of objections. The first are what I call the 'linguistic objections', which purport to show that the best available linguistic evidence suggests that 'knows' is not context-sensitive. The second is what I call the 'disagreement problem', which concerns the behaviour of 'knows' in disagreement reports. These may not be the only objections to epistemic contextualism, but they are probably the most influential. I argue that the best current epistemic contextualist response to the linguistic objection is incomplete, and I show how it can be supplemented to deal with the full range of linguistic objections. I also develop a new solution to the disagreement problem. The upshot is that neither sort of objection gives us any reason to reject epistemic contextualism. This conclusion is, in a sense, negative -no new arguments for epistemic contextualism are advanced -but it's a vital step towards rehabilitating the view. Introductory RemarksEpistemic contextualists -henceforth, 'contextualists' -think that the extension of the expression 'knows' (and its cognates) depends on and varies with the context of utterance. Consequently, in showing that contextualists can deal with these objections, I deal with the main reason why many reject contextualism. My conclusion is, in a sense, negative -no new arguments for contextualism are put forward -but it's a vital step towards rehabilitating the view.

Thought Sharing, Communication, and Perspectives about the Self

“…7 Paradigmatically (but not exclusively), the disagreement between A and B about whether p in a context c is manifested by the fact that A believes that p (or not p) and B believes that not p (or p) in c. As several authors have noted, the relevant conflict between the attitudes at hand need not consist of a direct contradiction of the form p and not p. A may, for instance, believe that p at c (say, that David Cameron is the British Prime Minister) and B believe that q at c (say, that Theresa May is the British Prime Minister) and very patently disagree with one another without thereby believing, respectively, propositions of the form p and not p. Furthermore, it is often also pointed out that the relevant conflict might involve non-doxastic attitudes, such as hopes or desires (e.g. Huvenes 2012;MacFarlane 2014;McKenna 2015). All the same, whenever there is disagreement between A and B, there must be a sort of conflict between A's and B's attitudes in the relevant context, such as the one arising paradigmatically (but not exclusively) in cases in which A believes that p (or not p) and B believes that not p (or p).…”