In the light of partial (mis)understanding, we examine the thesis that concepts are individuated in terms of possession conditions and show that adherents face a fatal dilemma: Either concept‐individuating possession conditions include cases of partially (mis)understood concepts or not. If yes, possession conditions do not individuate concepts. If no, the thesis is too restricted and lacks a minimally satisfactory level of generalization.

Introducción: En Chile, las enfermeras/os tienen respaldo legal para gestionar el cuidado, esto facilita el desarrollo de competencias para ejercer autonomía y liderazgo. Actualmente persisten barreras para transitar hacia un reconocimiento real de la independencia profesional. Objetivo: Develar la experiencia vivida de enfermeras con cargos en niveles de jefatura respecto al propio desarrollo para lograr el liderazgo y autonomía profesional. Metodología: Estudio cualitativo descriptivo-interpretativo, desde la trayectoria fenomenológica de Edmund Husserl. Muestreo selectivo de caso homogéneo de tres enfermeras que desempeñaban rol de jefatura en instituciones de salud, región Valparaíso, Chile. Participación consentida. Entrevista no estructurada. Análisis del discurso utilizando el modelo de liderazgo integral de Ken Wilber. Resultados: Categorías: Conciencia del líder «ser inquieta...intelectualmente». Construyendo competencias «el liderazgo se aprende». Transitando hacia el ejercicio de la autonomía y el liderazgo, “para el posicionamiento hay que luchar”. El peso de las estructuras organizacionales «tu rol es parte de un hospital». Interpretación: El eEjercicio del liderazgo y la autonomía se fundamenta en competencias actitudinales por sobre las cognitivas y técnicas. Existe mayor apoyo y reconocimiento a nivel institucional, que al interior del equipo de salud. Persisten limitaciones para lograr máxima expresión del liderazgo y autonomía, por persistencia de modelos institucionales hegemónicos, centrados en decisiones médicas y desconocimiento del rol integrado. Conclusión: El líder se mueve en un escenario dual, entre un menor reconocimiento del equipo y un creciente empoderamiento del rol autónomo y visibilidad a nivel directivo institucional.

Many scholars are ready to accept that first person thought involves a special way w such that, for any thinker x, only x can access the first person way w of thinking about x. Standard articulations of this Frege-inspired view involve a rejection of the strict shareability of first person thought. I argue that this rejection eventually forces us to renounce an intuitively plausible characterisation of communication, and specifically, disagreement. This result invites us to explore alternative articulations which, still within an overall Fregean framework, may better explain how first person thoughts reach out into a public, shareable dimension. Here I shape this possibility in terms of perspectives, i.e. ways of thinking that do not individuate concepts or thoughts. Perspectives, I submit, can serve to unproblematically accommodate basic disagreement in indexical cases and to outline the dynamic character of first person thought.

Theorists of first person thought seem to be faced with a pervasive dilemma: either accept the view that varying reference and sense are bound up together in first person thought, but then reject person-to-person shareability; or else, maintain the shareability of first person thought or belief at the price of giving up the connection between sense and subject-to-subject changing reference. Here, the author will argue that this is, in fact, a spurious dilemma based largely upon a failure to appreciate, if not the existence, at least the crucial importance of the distinction between types, instantiable types and instantiated types of thought or belief. Only the level of the instantiable type is relevant for a proper assessment of the question of whether two different subjects have the same first person thought.

Marr's celebrated contribution to cognitive science (Marr 1982, chap. 1) was the introduction of (at least) three levels of description/explanation. However, most contemporary research has relegated the distinction between levels to a rather dispensable remark. Ignoring such an important contribution comes at a price, or so we shall argue. In the present paper, first we review Marr's main points and motivations regarding levels of explanation. Second, we examine two cases in which the distinction between levels has been neglected when considering the structure of mental representations: Cummins et al.'s distinction between structural representation and encodings ) and Fodor's account of iconic representation (Fodor 2008). These two cases illustrate the kind of problems in which researchers can find themselves if they overlook distinctions between levels and how easily these problems can be solved when levels are carefully examined. The analysis of these cases allows us to conclude that researchers in the cognitive sciences are well advised to avoid risks of confusion by respecting Marr's old lesson.Ever since Marr's influential work on the computational account of vision (Marr 1982) it has been a familiar idea that computational research can be taken to involve (at least) three levels of description/explanation. These are: the level of the function to be computed; the level of the algorithm that computes the given function; and finally, the level of realization of the function in hardware structures.