Partial Understanding and Concept Possession: A Dilemma

Abstract

In the light of partial (mis)understanding, we examine the thesis that concepts are individuated in terms of possession conditions and show that adherents face a fatal dilemma: Either concept‐individuating possession conditions include cases of partially (mis)understood concepts or not. If yes, possession conditions do not individuate concepts. If no, the thesis is too restricted and lacks a minimally satisfactory level of generalization.

Fully Understanding Concept Possession

“…The argument shows that (1) is self-evident when possession conditions are concept-individuating understanding conditions. Only full understanding conditions provide full individuation -that is to say, individuation properly so-called-for the proponents of conceptindividuating possession conditions (see Verdejo and de Donato 2015 for a variation on this line of reasoning).…”

“…Nothing I have said here suggests that the determination challenge cannot be met and, in a sense, the moral drawn here for the theorist of concept possession is more optimistic than suggested elsewhere (cf. Verdejo and de Donato 2015). Provided that we do not give up on the assumption that possession conditions are or determine epistemologically construed understanding conditions, what we seem to need in order to meet the challenge is to articulate such conditions for understanding in ways that link up with a particular concept-individuating subject matter even in cases in which subjects have only partial understanding.…”

Moral responsibility for concepts

“…Revising my concept does, however, rationally commit me to judging (when appropriately prompted) that there is something problematic about my “earlier draft” of the concept. On partial understanding and concept possession, see Nordby () and Verdejo and de Donato Rodríguez ().…”

“…Revising my concept does, however, rationally commit me to judging (when appropriately prompted) that there is something problematic about my "earlier draft" of the concept. On partial understanding and concept possession, seeNordby (2004) andVerdejo and de Donato Rodríguez (2015).19 I do not think there is a bright line between those two kinds of conceptual change. For example, one's concept of marriage might have changed both because of changing (legal) reality and also because of new ways of understanding unchanged aspects of reality (like love, commitment, and justice).…”

“…For present purposes, I need not be able to identify when a specific person possesses a specific concept, because I only want to show that when someone does have and use a concept, it can be attributable to her in a way that makes her open to moral appraisal on that basis. I lack space to explain or adjudicate debates about how to understand possession conditions of concepts, how to differentiate concepts, or what count as mistaken applications of concepts, but see also Nordby (), Siebel (), and Verdejo and de Donato Rodríguez ().…”