Moral responsibility for concepts

Abstract

I argue that we are sometimes morally responsible for having and using (or not using) our concepts, despite the fact that we generally do not choose to have them or have full or direct voluntary control over how we use them. I do so by extending an argument of Angela Smith's; the same features that she says make us morally responsible for some of our attitudes also make us morally responsible for some of our concepts. Specifically, like attitudes, concepts can be (a) conceptually and rationally connected to our evaluative judgments, (b) in principle subject to rational revision (reasons‐responsive), and (c) the basis for actual and potential moral assessments of people that we have good reasons to endorse. Thus, we are open to moral appraisal on the basis of having and using (or not using) our concepts when they reflect our evaluative judgments, though even then it is not always appropriate to praise or blame us on that basis.

Moral responsibility for concepts, continued: Concepts as abstract objects

“…In Fredericks (2018b), I argued that we are sometimes morally responsible for having and using (or not using) our concepts as we do, even though we generally do not choose to have them or have full or direct voluntary control over how we use them. In doing so, I assumed (as I shall again in this section only) that concepts are mental representations, and thus that concepts are located in our minds and created by us (2018b, pp. 1381 and 1384).…”

“…I extended Smith's rational relations account of moral responsibility by arguing that the same features that Smith says make us morally responsible for some of our actions and attitudes also make us morally responsible for some of our concepts. Specifically, like our actions and attitudes, our “concepts can be: (a) conceptually and rationally connected to our evaluative judgments, (b) in principle subject to rational revision (reasons‐responsive), and (c) the basis for actual and potential moral assessments of people that we have good reasons to endorse” (Fredericks, 2018b, p. 1381). Thus, having and using (or not using) concepts can render us open to moral appraisal when, only when, and because such things reflect our evaluative judgments 2 .…”

“…To clarify, on this view, being morally responsible for something just is being open to moral appraisal on the basis of it, which is to say that one can legitimately be asked to justify or defend oneself regarding that thing. In affirming that an agent is morally responsible for something, it remains a further, open question whether they are also praiseworthy or blameworthy for it (or neither) (Fredericks, 2018b, p. 1381–1382).…”

“…In Fredericks (2018b), I argued that we can and should extend Angela Smith's (2005) rational relations account of moral responsibility to encompass not just responsibility for actions and attitudes (insofar as and because they can reflect agents' evaluative judgments), but also responsibility for the concepts that agents possess and use (or do not use), since those concepts can also reflect agents' evaluative judgments. In doing so, I assumed that concepts are mental representations, which made my radical proposal somewhat easier to swallow than it would otherwise be.…”

A Data-Driven Argument in Bioethics: Why Theologically Grounded Concepts May Not Provide the Necessary Intellectual Resources to Discuss Inequality and Injustice in Healthcare Contexts

“…By the normative function of a concept, we mean the ways in which the grasping (or possession of) some concepts are entangled with being disposed to make certain evaluative judgments (Fredericks 2018). In our understanding, some concepts are parts of complex conceptual frameworks (Betti and van den Berg 2014) containing, among other elements, evaluative judgments.…”