In this article we defend the inferential view of scientific models and idealisation. Models are seen as ''inferential prostheses'' (instruments for surrogative reasoning) construed by means of an idealisation-concretisation process, which we essentially understand as a kind of counterfactual deformation procedure (also analysed in inferential terms). The value of scientific representation is understood in terms not only of the success of the inferential outcomes arrived at with its help, but also of the heuristic power of representation and their capacity to correct and improve our models. This provides us with an argument against Sugden's account of credible models: the likelihood or realisticness (their ''credibility'') is not always a good measure of their acceptability. As opposed to ''credibility'' we propose the notion of ''enlightening'', which is the capacity of giving us understanding in the sense of an inferential ability.

In the light of partial (mis)understanding, we examine the thesis that concepts are individuated in terms of possession conditions and show that adherents face a fatal dilemma: Either concept‐individuating possession conditions include cases of partially (mis)understood concepts or not. If yes, possession conditions do not individuate concepts. If no, the thesis is too restricted and lacks a minimally satisfactory level of generalization.

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En este trabajo desarrollamos reconstrucciones estructuralistas de las teorías del flogisto, de Priestley, y del oxígeno, de Lavoisier. Nuestra propuesta es una alternativa a la de Caamaño (2009 y 2011) en una pretensión de ajustarnos más a las formulaciones de esas teorías tal y como se dieron históricamente.

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