Epistemic Subjectivism

White, Roger

doi:10.1353/epi.2007.0014

Cited by 4 publications

(6 citation statements)

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“…This thesis has recently attracted a great deal of interest among philosophers. For example, among those who argue in favor of the thesis are Feldman (, ), White (, , ), Christensen (), Matheson (), Horowitz (), Greco and Hedden (forthcoming), and Dogramaci and Horowitz (forthcoming). Among those who argue against the thesis are Douven (), Titelbaum (), Brueckner and Bundy (), Decker (), Rosa (), Kelly (), Meacham (), Peels and Booth (), Schoenfield (), Kopec (), Sharadin (forthcoming), Simpson (ms.), and Titelbaum and Kopec (ms.).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Uniqueness Thesis

Kopec

Titelbaum

2016

Philosophy Compass

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The Uniqueness Thesis holds, roughly speaking, that there is a unique rational response to any particular body of evidence. We first sketch some varieties of Uniqueness that appear in the literature. We then discuss some popular views that conflict with Uniqueness and others that require Uniqueness to be true. We then examine some arguments that have been presented in its favor and discuss why permissivists (i.e., those who deny Uniqueness) find them unconvincing. Last, we present some purported counterexamples that have been raised against Uniqueness and discuss some possible reasons why proponents of Uniqueness might find these similarly unconvincing.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Additional arguments targeting various versions of Uniqueness, and presented in varying levels of detail, can be found in Feldman (, ), Horowitz (), Matheson (), and White (, , ).…”

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confidence: 99%

The Uniqueness Thesis

Kopec

Titelbaum

2016

Philosophy Compass

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“…13Cf. MacFarlane 2005; Boghossian 2006; White 2007. The present theory captures some of the spirit of views that relativize reasonable belief to “frameworks,” “frames,” “worlds,” “conceptual schemes,” “ways of life,” and so on.…”

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confidence: 77%

Entitlement and Mutually Recognized Reasonable Disagreement

Hazlett¹

2013

Episteme

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Most people not only think that it is possible for reasonable people to disagree, but that it is possible for people to recognize that they are parties to a reasonable disagreement. The aim of this paper is to explain how such mutually recognized reasonable disagreements are possible. I appeal to an “entitlement claim” which implies a form of relativism about reasonable belief, based on the idea that whether a belief is reasonable for a person can depend on the fact that she has inherited a particular worldview from her community.

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“… Timothy Williamson (: 164) and Thomas Kelly (: §2) both call it a “platitude”. See also, amongst many others, Conee & Feldman (); Owens (); Kelly (); White (); Fantl & McGrath (); Huemer (); Smithies (); Greco (). …”

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confidence: 98%

“… Feldman (); White (: 120); Huemer (); Greco (); Titelbaum (). Horowitz () takes a nuanced stance on (ILC)—arguing that it holds for the most part, but occasionally fails.…”

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confidence: 99%

The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence

Worsnip

2015

Philos Phenomenol Research

116

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For many epistemologists, and for many philosophers more broadly, it is axiomatic that rationality requires you to take the doxastic attitudes that your evidence supports. Yet there is also another current in our talk about rationality. On this usage, rationality is a matter of the right kind of coherence between one's mental attitudes. Surprisingly little work in epistemology is explicitly devoted to answering the question of how these two currents of talk are related. But many implicitly assume that evidence-responsiveness guarantees coherence, so that the rational impermissibility of incoherence will just fall out of the putative requirement to take the attitudes that one's evidence supports, and so that coherence requirements do not need to be theorized in their own right, apart from evidential reasons. In this paper, I argue that this is a mistake, since coherence and evidenceresponsiveness can in fact come into conflict. More specifically, I argue that in cases of misleading higher-order evidence, there can be a conflict between believing what one's evidence supports and satisfying a requirement that I call "inter-level coherence". This illustrates why coherence requirements and evidential reasons must be separated and theorized separately.

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Epistemic Subjectivism

Cited by 4 publications

References 0 publications

The Uniqueness Thesis

The Uniqueness Thesis

Entitlement and Mutually Recognized Reasonable Disagreement

The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence

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