Epistemic Values and the Argument from Inductive Risk

Steel, Daniel

doi:10.1086/650206

Cited by 154 publications

(99 citation statements)

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“…Steel argues that it should be possible to amend the standards of evidence by the presence of risk (risk avoidance is a non-epistemic value) [63]. I think it is important, however, not to compromise our wish to satisfy the epistemic curiosity when we set the standards aimed at satisfying our prudential curiosity.…”

Section: How Certain Do We Need To Be? a Question Of Ethics As Well Amentioning

confidence: 99%

What Does It Take to Establish that a World Is Uninhabited Prior to Exploitation? A Question of Ethics as well as Science

Persson

2014

Challenges

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Abstract:If we find life on another world, it will be an extremely important discovery and we will have to take great care not to do anything that might endanger that life. If the life we find is sentient we will have moral obligations to that life. Whether it is sentient or not, we have a duty to ourselves to preserve it as a study object, and also because it would be commonly seen as valuable in its own right. In addition to this we would also have a duty to our fellow humans and other earthly life forms not to expose them to danger by advertently or inadvertently exposing them to potentially harmful space organisms. When space exploration turns into exploitation it will therefore be important to be able to show that a world that is up for exploitation is uninhabited before the exploitation starts. Showing that a world is uninhabited is, however, a different kind of task than showing that it is inhabited. The latter task can be accomplished through one positive finding but it is not clear how to go about the former task. In this paper I suggest that it is a gradual process asymptotically approaching certainty rather than a discovery in the traditional sense of the word. It has to be handled in two steps. The first is to connect degree of certainty with research setup. The second is to decide how certain we need to be. The first step is about the number, diversity and quality of observations. The second step is a decision we have to make based on the purpose of the investigation. The purpose and therefore the degree of certainty needed to establish that a world is uninhabited will be different for a world that is up for exploitation than for a world that is not. In the latter case it is only a matter of epistemic values. In the former case also ethical values have to be considered.

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Section: How Certain Do We Need To Be? a Question Of Ethics As Well Amentioning

confidence: 99%

What Does It Take to Establish that a World Is Uninhabited Prior to Exploitation? A Question of Ethics as well as Science

Persson

2014

Challenges

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“…In philosophy of science, the normative question has been the most controversial one (Steel 2010). As an example, Laudan (1984) points out that the validation of scientific knowledge must not be subject to any non-cognitive values.…”

Section: Values In Sciencementioning

confidence: 99%

“…2 Value-related debates underlie most of the current controversies with respect to the role of scientific knowledge in the evaluation and management of scientific and technological risks (Murphy et al 2006;Lacey 2005;Douglas 2000;Shrader-Frechette 2001, 2004aCranor 1993Cranor , 2011Steel 2011;Betz 2013;Mayo and Spanos 2006;Elliot and McKaughan 2009). What makes this issue even more pertinent from a philosophical standpoint is that in many senses science, at least when applied to decision making, appears not to be compatible with the traditional ideal of value-free science (Steel 2010(Steel , 2015Elliot and McKaughan 2009;Shrader-Frechette 1994;Cranor 1997;Douglas 2009). …”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The role of values in decision-oriented science has been studied from a variety of perspectives, focusing on the question of values in regulatory science and risk assessment (Shrader-Frechette 1989, 1994, 2004aCranor 1997;Douglas 2000Douglas , 2006Douglas , 2009Wandall 2004;Elliot and McKaughan 2009;Elliott 2011b;Steel 2010Steel , 2011. Our main objective in this paper is to analyze the diversity of roles that non-cognitive values can adopt in decision-oriented science, and the processes of learning about scientific methods and procedures they can put in motion.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Non-cognitive Values and Methodological Learning in the Decision-Oriented Sciences

Todt

Luján

2015

Found Sci

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The function and legitimacy of values in decision making is a critically important issue in the contemporary analysis of science. It is particularly relevant for some of the more application-oriented areas of science, specifically decision-oriented science in the field of regulation of technological risks. Our main objective in this paper is to assess the diversity of roles that non-cognitive values related to decision making can adopt in the kinds of scientific activity that underlie risk regulation. We start out, first, by analyzing the issue of values with the help of a framework taken from the wider philosophical debate on science and values. Second, we study the principal conceptualizations used by scholars who have applied them to numerous case studies. Third, we appraise the links between those conceptualizations and learning processes in decision-oriented science. In this, we recur to the concept of methodological learning, i.e., learning about the best methodologies for generating knowledge that is useful for science-based regulatory decisions. The main result of our analysis is that non-cognitive values can contribute to methodological improvements in science in three principal ways: (a) as basis for critical analysis (to differentiate ''sound'' from ''bad'' science), (b) for contextualizing methodologies (by identifying links between methods and objectives), and (c) for establishing the burden of proof (in order to generate data that otherwise would not be generated).

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“…Place has been most extensively developed by geographers of science, whose efforts have contributed to a disciplinary 'spatial turn' in the history and philosophy of science (Finnegan 2008;Livingstone 2010;Naylor 2005), which has prompted a re-evaluation of the laboratory as a singularly important kind of place (Gooday 2008). Epistemic values have become increasingly important in the history and philosophy of science (along with epistemic goals), as scientific research programmes that deal with social, environmental, and industrial issues have become more central (Elliott 2011;Steel 2010). Practices meanwhile have been at the heart of some of our most innovative histories and philosophies of experiment (Chang 2012;Rheinberger 1997), though in such cases the emphasis on laboratory practice makes them exceedingly difficult to extend to the field.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The resisted rise of randomisation in experimental design: British agricultural science, c.1910–1930

Berry

2015

HPLS

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The most conspicuous form of agricultural experiment is the field trial, and within the history of such trials, the arrival of the randomised control trial (RCT) is considered revolutionary. Originating with R.A. Fisher within British agricultural science in the 1920s and 30s, the RCT has since become one of the most prodigiously used experimental techniques throughout the natural and social sciences. Philosophers of science have already scrutinised the epistemological uniqueness of RCTs, undermining their status as the 'gold standard' in experimental design. The present paper introduces a historical case study from the origins of the RCT, uncovering the initially cool reception given to this method by agricultural scientists at the University of Cambridge and the (Cambridge based) National Institute of Agricultural Botany (NIAB). Rather than giving further attention to the RCT, the paper focuses instead on a competitor method -the half-drill strip -which both predated the RCT and remained in wide use for at least a decade beyond the latter's arrival. In telling this history, John Pickstone's Ways of Knowing is adopted, as the most flexible, and productive way to write the history of science, particularly when sciences and scientists have to work across a number of different kinds of place. It is shown that those who resisted the RCT did so in order to preserve epistemic and social goals that randomisation would have otherwise run a tractor through. KeywordsField science; Agriculture; Randomised Control Trials; Epistemic goals; Ways of knowing AcknowledgmentsFirstly my thanks to Giuditta Parolini for conceiving of this special issue and inviting my contribution. Giuditta gave extensive feedback on numerous drafts, for which I am very grateful. Two anonymous reviewers and Staffan Müller-Wille greatly improved the article with excellent criticisms and suggestions. Greg Radick, Lijing Jiang, and Carl Warom gave generously with their time scrutinising final drafts. Matt Paskins and Mike Finn discussed the paper with me on a number of occasions, suggesting important changes. Lastly I thank those at the 10th iHPS meeting in Durham (and the conference organisers) who responded to this work with exciting questions (particularly

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Epistemic Values and the Argument from Inductive Risk

Cited by 154 publications

References 36 publications

What Does It Take to Establish that a World Is Uninhabited Prior to Exploitation? A Question of Ethics as well as Science

What Does It Take to Establish that a World Is Uninhabited Prior to Exploitation? A Question of Ethics as well as Science

Non-cognitive Values and Methodological Learning in the Decision-Oriented Sciences

The resisted rise of randomisation in experimental design: British agricultural science, c.1910–1930

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