Equilibrium selection and the dynamic evolution of preferences

Coevolution of Deception and Preferences: Darwin and Nash Meet Machiavelli

“…As in these papers, we provide results to the e¤ect that di¤erent degrees of cognitive sophistication may co-exist. The model of Conlisk (2001) is very similar to our analysis of the Rock-Paper-6 See Norman (2012) for related results in a dynamic model. Scissors game in Section 5.3, below.…”

Population Games and Deterministic Evolutionary Dynamics

“…In typical (specifically, contractible) cases, this means that a component can only be asymptotically stable if its index is 1. A partial list includes auctions (Louge and Riedel, 2012); fiat money (Sethi, 1999); conspicuous consumption (Friedman and Ostrov, 2008); common resource use (Sethi and Somanathan, 1996); cultural evolution (Bisin and Verdier, 2001;Sandholm, 2001c;Kuran and Sandholm, 2008;Montgomery, 2010); the evolution of language (Pawlowitsch, 2008); implementation problems (Cabrales and Ponti, 2000;Sandholm, 2002Sandholm, , 2005bFujishima, 2012); international trade (Friedman and Fung, 1996); residential segregation (Dokumacı and Sandholm, 2007); preference evolution (Sandholm, 2001c;Heifetz et al, 2007;Norman, 2012); and theories of mind (Mohlin, 2012). are precisely the ones in which traditional equilibrium assumptions seem questionable.…”

Indirect Evolution and Aggregate-Taking Behavior in a Football League: Utility Maximization, Profit Maximization, and Success

“…If there is a certain type of preferences that supports these higher payoffs, those preferences will also co-evolve, whereas the other preferences will decline or even vanish. For instance, the dynamic evolution of preferences was analyzed by Norman [31] with a replicator dynamics approach. Therefore, even preferences, and, hence, utility functions, are not necessarily fixed over time for the population as a whole; they are, rather, endogenously determined by success and failure.…”