2006
DOI: 10.2202/1534-598x.1333
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Equilibrium Uniqueness in a Cournot Model with Demand Uncertainty

Abstract: If Cournot oligopolists face uncertainty about the intercept of a linear demand function and if the realized market price must be non-negative, then expected demand becomes convex, which can create a multiplicity of equilibria. This note shows that if the distribution of the demand intercept has a monotone hazard rate and if another, rather weak, assumption is satisfied, then uniqueness of equilibrium is guaranteed.

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Cited by 15 publications
(30 citation statements)
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“…2 ; has a Cournot equilibrium. 10 The function P (! ; ) need not (and typically will not) be di¤erentiable at Q (!)…”
Section: Cournot Equilibrium With Always Non-negative Pricesmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…2 ; has a Cournot equilibrium. 10 The function P (! ; ) need not (and typically will not) be di¤erentiable at Q (!)…”
Section: Cournot Equilibrium With Always Non-negative Pricesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In a non-linear setting, Einy et al (2003) derive conditions under which the value of public information in an oligopoly is either positive or negative, but assume that the …rms are symmetrically informed, which allows to reduce the equilibrium existence question to that in a complete information oligopoly. The assumption of symmetry of information, and a reduction to the complete information case that it allows, also stand behind the existence result of Lagerlöf (2006). In Einy et al (2002) a categorical approach is used: it is assumed that an equilibrium exists, and then its properties are investigated.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Their standard version concerns the case in which the players produce a good with complete information about the demand and production costs of all other players [18]. In the last decades extensive research has been dedicated to questions that arise when the information is incomplete, such as uncertainties in the demand or the producers' cost functions [19]. In [20] we have recently explored a game theoretic framework for multiple energy producers competing in energy market.…”
Section: Related Work and Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, in most previous studies, it was assumed that firms cannot change their behaviour or the change in the strategic behaviour was modelled as an exogenous random parameter. Recently, Lagerlöf (2006) provided the conditions for the distribution of demand uncertainty such that the uniqueness of equilibrium is guaranteed, but only theoretically. Another problem stems from the fact that firms exhibit different attitudes towards uncertainty.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%