-Intervention provides a reliable cue to veridical causality. Just as an experimenter manipulates variables to distinguish cause and effect from mere correlation, so might a rat learn differently about the effects of its own actions. However, theory remains vague on specific predictions. The present study asks whether and how producing a conditional stimulus by lever contact alters what a rat learns about that stimulus. Despite the theoretical pressure among theories of causal reasoning for an effect of intervention to hold, the effect we found was not in standard goal-oriented response variables, but in a general activity measure, and so not readily interpretable by typical theories of causal reasoning. We propose a viable explanation for this pattern in terms of multiple foraging strategies. The primary contribution of the present results is that they pose three challenges to theories that concern how animals deal with cause and effect: 1) to resolve present ambiguities regarding predictions; 2) to situate causal cognition research in specific ecological contexts, such as predation; and 3) to look beyond goal acquisition, to the rest of the animal's behavior, including general activity. We present one potential solution in alignment with behavior systems approaches.
Keywords -Intervention, Causal reasoning, Graphical models, Behavior systems, General activity, Rattus norvegicusExperimenters manipulate variables to discern cause and effect from mere correlation. They understand that producing a potential cause by one's own action to observe its effects (intervention) is crucial to their ability to attribute causation, and how observing covariation in this context provides much stronger evidence of causation than observing the same pattern occurring without control over relevant variables. However, it is not only experimenters who experiment. Cooks experiment with recipes; electricians experiment with circuits; and the rest of us experiment with recipes, circuits, plumbing, automotive repair, and whenever we attempt to decipher hidden causal factors. When we do, we are not always very principled scientists about it (even the principled scientists), but whatever experimental control we may overlook while adjusting the amount of sugar in a cake, reliably, when we test causal factors, here or in any domain, we intervene on variables.Likewise, rats are not merely passive observers, but engage in reliable patterns of appetitive behavior in which they interact with objects in their environments in system-specific ways. A feedingready rat will root, gnaw, and manipulate protrusions, thereby producing effects that may provide meaningful cues to causality. Such information is often available to be exploited by an active learner. Do they use this information appropriately? Are rats naïve experimenters? To be clear, the question is not whether rats are doing what a trained experimenter does. Rather, one can imagine a rat testing hypotheses with no more foresight than shown by human naïve experimenters. For instanc...