ERP evidence of visualization at early stages of visual processing

Page, Jonathan W.; Duhamel, Paul; Crognale, Michael A.

doi:10.1016/j.bandc.2010.11.001

Cited by 24 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…The similarities in characteristic performance profile and the particular patterns of interference are good (if non‐decisive) reasons to conjecture that imagining seeing and actually seeing involve representations with a common format. This conjecture is indirectly supported by evidence that imagining seeing and actually seeing not only have a common neural basis but also involve similar patterns of cortical activation (e.g., Page et al. 2011).…”

Section: A Motor Format For Representationmentioning

confidence: 89%

Intention and Motor Representation in Purposive Action

Butterfill

Sinigaglia

2012

Philos Phenomenol Research

149

119

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Are there distinct roles for intention and motor representation in explaining the purposiveness of action? Standard accounts of action assign a role to intention but are silent on motor representation. The temptation is to suppose that nothing need be said here because motor representation is either only an enabling condition for purposive action or else merely a variety of intention. This paper provides reasons for resisting that temptation. Some motor representations, like intentions, coordinate actions in virtue of representing outcomes; but, unlike intentions, motor representations cannot feature as premises or conclusions in practical reasoning. This implies that motor representation has a distinctive role in explaining the purposiveness of action. It also gives rise to a problem: were the roles of intention and motor representation entirely independent, this would impair effective action. It is therefore necessary to explain how intentions interlock with motor representations. The solution, we argue, is to recognise that the contents of intentions can be partially determined by the contents of motor representations. Understanding this contentdetermining relation enables better understanding how intentions relate to actions.

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Section: A Motor Format For Representationmentioning

confidence: 89%

Intention and Motor Representation in Purposive Action

Butterfill

Sinigaglia

2012

Philos Phenomenol Research

149

119

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“…Recent advances in neuroimaging methodology make it possible to have a clear idea about early cortical processing in mental imagery (e.g., the primary visual cortex, see Page et al., 2011 , Slotnick et al., 2005 ). And the retinotopy ( Grill-Spector & Malach, 2004 ) of the early visual cortices (and their equivalent in the other sense modalities, see, e.g., Talavage et al., 2004 ) also makes it possible to track the content of mental imagery without having to resort to the subjects' introspective reports [a fact that highlights that mental imagery does not have to be conscious (see Church, 2008 , Nanay, 2010a , Nanay, 2015 , Phillips, 2014 for philosophical arguments and Zeman et al., 2007 , Zeman et al., 2010 , Zeman et al., 2015 for experimental evidence)].…”

Section: Unifying Philosophical Psychological and Neuroscientific Pementioning

confidence: 99%

“…And we can safely assume that cortical processing is perceptual processing. If we have such early cortical processing but no corresponding sensory stimulation, we have (visual) mental imagery (see Page et al., 2011 , Slotnick et al., 2005 , but see also Bridge, Harrold, Holmes, Stokes, & Kennard, 2012 for caution about how to think of ‘early cortical’ in this context).…”

Section: Unifying Philosophical Psychological and Neuroscientific Pementioning

confidence: 99%

Multimodal mental imagery

Nánay

2018

Cortex

180

100

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When I am looking at my coffee machine that makes funny noises, this is an instance of multisensory perception – I perceive this event by means of both vision and audition. But very often we only receive sensory stimulation from a multisensory event by means of one sense modality, for example, when I hear the noisy coffee machine in the next room, that is, without seeing it. The aim of this paper is to bring together empirical findings about multimodal perception and empirical findings about (visual, auditory, tactile) mental imagery and argue that on occasions like this, we have multimodal mental imagery: perceptual processing in one sense modality (here: vision) that is triggered by sensory stimulation in another sense modality (here: audition). Multimodal mental imagery is not a rare and obscure phenomenon. The vast majority of what we perceive are multisensory events: events that can be perceived in more than one sense modality – like the noisy coffee machine. And most of the time we are only acquainted with these multisensory events via a subset of the sense modalities involved – all the other aspects of these multisensory events are represented by means of multisensory mental imagery. This means that multisensory mental imagery is a crucial element of almost all instances of everyday perception.

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“…Another kind of involuntary mental imagery is the following: It has been argued (Nanay 2010b) that amodal perception (or at least most instances of amodal perception, see Briscoe 2011), that is, the representation of unseen parts of objects we see, is also a sub-category of mental imagery, where, again, we attribute properties quasi-perceptually to a part of the perceived object that is not visible (see also Page et al 2011). Further, if mental imagery is a necessary feature of episodic memory (Byrne et al 2007, see also Berryhill et al 2007's overview), then it is also involuntary inasmuch as episodic memory can also be involuntary.…”

Section: Mental Imagerymentioning

confidence: 99%