Error Handling of In-vehicle Networks Makes Them Vulnerable

Cho, Kyong-Tak; Shin, Kang G.

doi:10.1145/2976749.2978302

Cited by 198 publications

(151 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…For example, the authors in [7] point out that using simple methods can disrupt the operation of a car and even disable the vehicle. Further, the authors in [8] illustrate a case study, where a Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack can be launched to compromise the CAN bus and the functionalities dependent on the bus. This issue is even more emphasized with the rise of vehicle autonomy, because the autonomy will exacerbate the consequences of attacks.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cyber-Physical System Checkpointing and Recovery

Kong

Weimer

et al. 2018

2018 ACM/IEEE 9th International Conference on Cyber-Physical Systems (ICCPS)

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Transitioning to more open architectures has been making Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) vulnerable to malicious attacks that are beyond the conventional cyber attacks. This paper studies attack-resilience enhancement for a system under emerging attacks in the environment of the controller. An effective way to address this problem is to make system state estimation accurate enough for control regardless of the compromised components. This work follows this way and develops a procedure named CPS checkpointing and recovery, which leverages historical data to recover failed system states. Specially, we first propose a new concept of physical-state recovery. The essential operation is defined as rolling the system forward starting from a consistent historical system state. Second, we design a checkpointing protocol that defines how to record system states for the recovery. The protocol introduces a sliding window that accommodates attackdetection delay to improve the correctness of stored states. Third, we present a use case of CPS checkpointing and recovery that deals with compromised sensor measurements. At last, we evaluate our design through conducting simulator-based experiments and illustrating the use of our design with an unmanned vehicle case study. DisciplinesComputer Engineering | Computer Sciences Abstract-Transitioning to more open architectures has been making Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) vulnerable to malicious attacks that are beyond the conventional cyber attacks. This paper studies attack-resilience enhancement for a system under emerging attacks in the environment of the controller. An effective way to address this problem is to make system state estimation accurate enough for control regardless of the compromised components. This work follows this way and develops a procedure named CPS checkpointing and recovery, which leverages historical data to recover failed system states. Specially, we first propose a new concept of physical-state recovery. The essential operation is defined as rolling the system forward starting from a consistent historical system state. Second, we design a checkpointing protocol that defines how to record system states for the recovery. The protocol introduces a sliding window that accommodates attack-detection delay to improve the correctness of stored states. Third, we present a use case of CPS checkpointing and recovery that deals with compromised sensor measurements. At last, we evaluate our design through conducting simulator-based experiments and illustrating the use of our design with an unmanned vehicle case study.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cyber-Physical System Checkpointing and Recovery

Kong

Weimer

et al. 2018

2018 ACM/IEEE 9th International Conference on Cyber-Physical Systems (ICCPS)

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…According to the attackers' capabilities, they can be considered as either strong attackers or weak attackers [15]. Strong attackers are those who can fully compromise an ECU and gain control of its software and memory.…”

Section: Attack Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Therefore, a weak attacker can only stop the weakly compromised ECU or eavesdrop on the CAN bus. In this paper, we focus on the existing attack cases that have been implemented to severely impair the in-vehicle security [7], [13], [15]. These attacks are composed of the following four basic attack models: • Replay Attack.…”

Section: Attack Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

LEAP: A Lightweight Encryption and Authentication Protocol for In-Vehicle Communications

Wang

Chen

et al. 2019

2019 IEEE Intelligent Transportation Systems Conference (ITSC)

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The Controller Area Network (CAN) is considered as the de-facto standard for the in-vehicle communications due to its real-time performance and high reliability. Unfortunately, the lack of security protection on the CAN bus gives attackers the opportunity to remotely compromise a vehicle. In this paper, we propose a Lightweight Encryption and Authentication Protocol (LEAP) with low cost and high efficiency to address the security issue of the CAN bus. LEAP exploits the securityenhanced stream cipher primitive to provide encryption and authentication for the CAN messages. Compared with the state-of-the-art Message Authentication Code (MAC) based approaches, LEAP requires less memory, is 8X faster, and thwarts the most recently proposed attacks.

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“…Of the research to build intrusion detection systems (IDSs) for the currently-adopted CAN systems, there is a natural trichotomy: 1) Rule-based IDS: Early works involve rule-based detectors, an analogue of signature-based detection in enterprise security. These can detect simple signal-injection attacks, (sophisticated but very limited) bus-off attacks (see Cho et al [12]), and potentially ECU reprogramming [13][14][15]. 2) Frequency-based IDS: Important CAN messages are sent redundantly with fixed frequency.…”

Section: A Related Can Ids Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Exploiting the Shape of CAN Data for In-Vehicle Intrusion Detection

Tyree

Bridges

Combs

et al. 2018

2018 IEEE 88th Vehicular Technology Conference (VTC-Fall)

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Modern vehicles rely on scores of electronic control units (ECUs) broadcasting messages over a few controller area networks (CANs). Bereft of security features, in-vehicle CANs are exposed to cyber manipulation and multiple researches have proved viable, life-threatening cyber attacks. Complicating the issue, CAN messages lack a common mapping of functions to commands, so packets are observable but not easily decipherable. We present a transformational approach to CAN IDS that exploits the geometric properties of CAN data to inform two novel detectors-one based on distance from a learned, lower dimensional manifold and the other on discontinuities of the manifold over time. Proof-of-concept tests are presented by implementing a potential attack approach on a driving vehicle. The initial results suggest that (1) the first detector requires additional refinement but does hold promise; (2) the second detector gives a clear, strong indicator of the attack; and (3) the algorithms keep pace with high-speed CAN messages. As our approach is data-driven it provides a vehicle-agnostic IDS that eliminates the need to reverse engineer CAN messages and can be ported to an after-market plugin.

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Error Handling of In-vehicle Networks Makes Them Vulnerable

Cited by 198 publications

References 12 publications

Cyber-Physical System Checkpointing and Recovery

Cyber-Physical System Checkpointing and Recovery

LEAP: A Lightweight Encryption and Authentication Protocol for In-Vehicle Communications

Exploiting the Shape of CAN Data for In-Vehicle Intrusion Detection

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