LEAP: A Lightweight Encryption and Authentication Protocol for In-Vehicle Communications

Lu, Zhaojun; Wang, Qian; Chen, Xi; Qu, Gang; Lyu, Yeoung-Su; Liu, Zhenglin

doi:10.1109/itsc.2019.8917500

Cited by 33 publications

(17 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…Also, they provide precise information to prevent damage from malicious adversaries. Some papers (Lu et al , 2019; Lakshmanan and Natarajan, 2019; Wang and Sawhney, 2014; Mundhenk et al , 2017) focus on cryptography method to ensure the network security. This method is one the popular solution which guarantees that the CAN data frame transmitted from one node to another is authorized.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cybersecurity attacks on CAN bus based vehicles: a review and open challenges

Fakhfakh

Tounsi

Mosbah

2021

LHT

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PurposeNowadays, connected vehicles are becoming quite complex systems which are made up of different devices. In such a vehicle, there are several electronic control units (ECUs) that represent basic units of computation. These ECUs communicate with each other over the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus protocol which ensures a high communication rate. Even though it is an efficient standard which provides communication for in-vehicle networks, it is prone to various cybersecurity attacks. This paper aims to present a systematic literature review (SLR) which focuses on potential attacks on CAN bus networks. Then, it surveys the solutions proposed to overcome these attacks. In addition, it investigates the validation strategies aiming to check their accuracy and correctness.Design/methodology/approachThe authors have adopted the SLR methodology to summarize existing research papers that focus on the potential attacks on CAN bus networks. In addition, they compare the selected papers by classifying them according to the adopted validation strategies. They identify also gaps in the existing literature and provide a set of open challenges that can significantly improve the existing works.FindingsThe study showed that most of the examined papers adopted the simulation as a validation strategy to imitate the system behavior and evaluate a set of performance criteria. Nevertheless, a little consideration has been given to the formal verification of the proposed systems.Originality/valueUnlike the existing surveys, this paper presents the first SLR that identifies local and remote security attacks that can compromise in-vehicle and inter-vehicle communications. Moreover, it compares the reviewed papers while focusing on the used validation strategies.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cybersecurity attacks on CAN bus based vehicles: a review and open challenges

Fakhfakh

Tounsi

Mosbah

2021

LHT

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“…There are no additional advantages beyond those analyzed in the game above. Thus, by equations ( 14), ( 17), (19), and (21) we can claim that the advantages of A to the proposed EC-SVC are as given by…”

Section: The Advantage Adv Ec-svcmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…Some studies tried to construct their protocols by considering the real-time constraint of in-vehicle communications. However, they ended up meeting only low-level basic security requirements using symmetric-based cryptographic schemes [9], [11], [16], [17], [19]. Therefore, for secure in-vehicle communications, it is desirable to develop new techniques that give lower computation burden to ECUs, while providing a higher level of security, which is the main objective of this paper.…”

Section: B Motivation and Contributionmentioning

confidence: 99%

EC-SVC: Secure CAN Bus In-Vehicle Communications with Fine-grained Access Control Based on Edge Computing

Donghyun¹,

Hsu²,

Lee³

2020

Preprint

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In-vehicle communications are not designed for message exchange between the vehicles and outside systems originally. Thus, the security design of message protection is insufficient. Moreover, the internal devices do not have enough resources to process the additional security operations. Nonetheless, due to the characteristic of the in-vehicle network in which messages are broadcast, secure message transmission to specific receivers must be ensured. With consideration of the facts aforementioned, this work addresses resource problems by offloading secure operations to high-performance devices, and uses attribute-based access control to ensure the confidentiality of messages from attackers and unauthorized users. In addition, we reconfigure existing access control based cryptography to address new vulnerabilities arising from the use of edge computing and attribute-based access control. Thus, this paper proposes an edge computing-based security protocol with fine-grained attributebased encryption using a hash function, symmetric-based cryptography, and reconfigured cryptographic scheme. In addition, this work formally proves the reconfigured cryptographic scheme and security protocol, and evaluates the feasibility of the proposed security protocol in various aspects using the CANoe software.

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“…LEAP [58] attempts to overcome the computational costs of the MAC-based authentication by using a stream cipher, RC4, to encrypt and authenticate CAN messages. It uses a dedicated ECU to store the long-term symmetric keys used for generating the session keys.…”

Section: A Security Based On Authenticationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Review of the Security of Backward-Compatible Automotive Inter-ECU Communication

et al. 2021

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Advanced electronic units inside modern vehicles have enhanced the driving experience, but also introduced a myriad of security problems due to the inherent limitations of the internal communication protocol. In the last two decades, a number of security threats have been identified and accordingly, security measures have been proposed. While a large body of research on the vehicular security domain is focused on exposing vulnerabilities and proposing counter measures, there is an apparent paucity of research aimed at reviewing existing works on automotive security and at extracting insights. This paper provides a systematic review of security threats and countermeasures for the ubiquitous CAN bus communication protocol. It further exposes the limitations of the existing security measures, and discusses a seemingly-overlooked, simple, cost-effective and incrementally deployable solution which can provide a reasonable defense against a major class of packet injection attacks and many denial of service attacks.

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LEAP: A Lightweight Encryption and Authentication Protocol for In-Vehicle Communications

Cited by 33 publications

References 14 publications

Cybersecurity attacks on CAN bus based vehicles: a review and open challenges

Cybersecurity attacks on CAN bus based vehicles: a review and open challenges

EC-SVC: Secure CAN Bus In-Vehicle Communications with Fine-grained Access Control Based on Edge Computing

Review of the Security of Backward-Compatible Automotive Inter-ECU Communication

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