Here, then, I will bring together two broad surveys, necessarily incomplete, that will serve as a kind of mutual commentary. The first, a survey of methodological and theoretical approaches to emotion and to humour in particular, seeks to understand how studies of emotion have pressed us to find new critical methods and to upend critical norms. Examining the claims of emotions history in contrast to various strands of affect theory, I assess the convergences among these approaches. The second survey, of some key late seventeenth-and eighteenth-century discussions of humour, examines in particular the way theories of comedy in this period seize on humour as a critical method. In the eighteenth century, humour could be a critical term of artas in 'humours comedy'and an aspect of the self. Humour serves, in different contexts, as a prescription for playwrights, a description of comic characters, a national diagnosis, and a fundamental perceptive capacity. This survey seeks to understand how humour bridges corporeality and cognition in ways that comment on critical axioms then and now. The tentative suggestion of this chapter is that studies of emotion, historical and theoretical, insistently refuse us methodological certainty.The methods of emotions history have long been established in twentiethcentury critical paradigms. From Norbert Elias, who effectively linked cultural revolutions to emotional dispositions in The Civilizing Process (1939, trans. 1969) to Raymond Williams, who argued in Marxism and Literature (1977) that 'structures of feeling' are the indices of the interpenetration of history and form, and Richard Sennett, who observed that eighteenth-century England was 'a society where intimate feeling is an all-purpose standard of reality', 3 critics across disciplines have agreed that the foundations of cultural materialism relied on a deep recognition of two important truths: that emotion is an essential (perhaps the essential) register of