Establishing confident accounting for Russian weapons plutonium

Wood, Thomas W.; Reid, Bruce D.; Smoot, John L.; Fuller, James L.

doi:10.1080/10736700208436898

Cited by 6 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…This method is a way to access more information than was previously available with other SIMS techniques. Although many radiometric analysis techniques have proven to be useful in similar analyses, mass spectrometry is ideal for the identification and measurement of nuclear archeology signatures [6][7][8]13].…”

Section: Similar Signatures Have Previously Been Identified By Sims Amentioning

confidence: 99%

Secondary ion mass spectrometry signatures for verifying declarations of fissile‐material production

Willingham

Naes

Burns

et al. 2015

Applied Radiation and Isotopes

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Direct analysis of uranium enrichment facility components were performed using secondary ion mass spectrometry (SIMS). A standard protocol was developed to enable preparation of SIMS samples from a corroded pipe piece without disturbing the corrosion layer. Unique uranium, oxygen and fluorine containing signatures were discovered in the corrosion layer by performing a mass scan of the region of interest from 230 to 280amu. These signatures identified the source of the corrosion layer as uranium hexafluoride (UF6) or an associated hydrolysis product. Isotopic analysis of the corrosion layer determined enrichment of (235)U to a value of 0.0116±0.0019 for the (235)U/(238)U isotopic ratio as compared to the NIST traceable standard (CRM 112-A) with a natural (235)U/(238)U isotopic ratio of 0.007254±0.000004. SIMS depth analysis revealed that the corrosion layer was isotopically homogenous to a depth of ~23.5µm. Optical profilometry measurements prior to and following SIMS depth analysis were used to determine a sputter rate of 0.48nm/s for 18.5keV O(-) ion bombardment of the corrosion layer. The data presented is conclusive evidence that SIMS depth analysis can be used to identify novel nuclear archeology signatures from uranium enrichment components and perform meaningful isotopic analysis of these signatures.

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Section: Similar Signatures Have Previously Been Identified By Sims Amentioning

confidence: 99%

Secondary ion mass spectrometry signatures for verifying declarations of fissile‐material production

Willingham

Naes

Burns

et al. 2015

Applied Radiation and Isotopes

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“…The graphite isotope-ratio method (GIRM) has been successfully tested on the Trawsfynydd Unit II Magnox reactor. 405 All ten UK military production reactors have now been shut down. Under current decommissioning plans, their graphite moderators will be left intact for many years to come.…”

Section: Verifying the Uk Fissile Materials Declarationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A disarmament agenda

Feder

2015

Phys. Today

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The International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM) was founded in January 2006. It is an independent group of arms-control and nonproliferation experts from seventeen countries, including both nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states.The mission of the IPFM is to analyze the technical basis for practical and achievable policy initiatives to secure, consolidate, and reduce stockpiles of highly enriched uranium and plutonium. These fissile materials are the key ingredients in nuclear weapons, and their control is critical to nuclear disarmament, halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and ensuring that terrorists do not acquire nuclear weapons.Both military and civilian stocks of fissile materials have to be addressed. The nuclear weapon states still have enough fissile materials in their weapon and naval fuel stockpiles for tens of thousands of nuclear weapons. On the civilian side, enough plutonium has been separated to make a similarly large number of weapons. Highly enriched uranium is used in civilian reactor fuel in more than one hundred locations. The total amount used for this purpose is sufficient to make hundreds of Hiroshima-type bombs, a design potentially within the capabilities of terrorist groups.

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“…In addition, one would group Φ and σ by energy-groups, but we list the 1-group values for simplicity 2. We define the cooling time as the sum of all pure decay periods, including shutdowns.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In particular, the fluence is often related to the fuel burnup and, hence, the plutonium production and grade [1]. This makes the fluence an important parameter for nonproliferation and arms reduction [2]. The fluence of a sample can be inferred in many ways, but is most commonly derived from isotopic ratios of actinides, such as 235 U/ 238 U or 236 U/ 235 U [3,4] and various plutonium ratios [5].…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Developing Diagnostic Tools for Low-Burnup Reactor Samples

et al. 2017

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We test common fluence diagnostics in the regime of very low burnup natural uranium reactor samples. The fluence diagnostics considered are the uranium isotopics ratios 235 U/ 238 U and 236 U/ 235 U, for which we find simple analytic formulas agree well with full reactor simulation predictions. Both ratios agree reasonably well with one another for fluences in the mid 10 19 n/cm 2 range. However, below about 10 19 n/cm 2 the concentrations of 236 U are found to be sufficiently low that the measured 236 U/ 235 U ratios become unreliable. We also derive and test diagnostics for determining sample cooling times in situations where very low burnup and very long cooling times render many standard diagnostics, such as the 241 Am/ 241 Pu ratio, impractical. We find that using several fragment ratios are necessary to detect the presence of systematic errors, such as fractionation.

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Establishing confident accounting for Russian weapons plutonium

Cited by 6 publications

References 2 publications

Secondary ion mass spectrometry signatures for verifying declarations of fissile‐material production

Secondary ion mass spectrometry signatures for verifying declarations of fissile‐material production

A disarmament agenda

Developing Diagnostic Tools for Low-Burnup Reactor Samples

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