Estimates of the Value of Patent Rights in European Countries During the Post-1950 Period

Schankerman, Mark; Pakes, Ariél

doi:10.2307/2233173

Cited by 585 publications

(386 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…Indicators used are e.g., the number of citations received (Trajtenberg 1990, Harhoff et al 1999, Lanjouw/Schankerman 1999, the number of claims (Lanjouw/Schankerman 1999 and, the incidence of an opposition or litigation (Lanjouw/Schankerman 1999, Harhoff/Reitzig 2001, Harhoff/Hall 2003, or patent renewal data (Pakes 1986, Schankerman/Pakes 1986, Lanjouw et al 1998. Results of most of these approaches have one element in common: they provide evidence for a highly skewed distribution of patent value (i.e., Harhoff et al 1999, Scherer et al 2000.…”

Section: Salient Features Of Invention Processesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Institutionalized incentives for ingenuity—Patent value and the German Employees’ Inventions Act

Harhoff

Hoisl²

2007

Research Policy

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Germany is one of few countries in which the monetary compensation for inventors is not only determined by negotiations between employer and employee-inventor, but also by relatively precise legal provisions. In this paper, we describe the characteristics of the German Employees' Inventions Act (GEIA) and discuss which incentives it creates. We rely on responses from a recent survey of 3,350 German inventors to test hypotheses regarding this institution. We conclude from our data that the law creates substantial monetary rewards for productive inventors. The qualitative responses from our survey confirm this view, but also point to a number of dysfunctional effects.

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Section: Salient Features Of Invention Processesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Institutionalized incentives for ingenuity—Patent value and the German Employees’ Inventions Act

Harhoff

Hoisl²

2007

Research Policy

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“…Pakes and Schankerman (1984), Schankerman and Pakes (1986), Pakes (1986), Lanjouw (1992), and Lanjouw, Pakes and Putnam (1996). 3 See e.g.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Exploring the Tail of Patented Invention Value Distributions

Harhoff¹,

Scherer

Vopel

2003

Economics, Law and Intellectual Property

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*Patent renewal studies reveal a highly rightward-skewed distribution of patent values. Our approach elicits valuations approximating those of the patented invention. This paper focuses on the full-term patents of the application year 1977 held by West German and U.S. residents. The tail of skewed distributions values account for a large fraction of the cumulative value over all observations. Several tests were conducted to pin down more precisely the nature of the high-value tail distribution. Three highly skew alternatives were evaluated by graphical and maximum likelihood techniques: the two-parameter log normal, the one-parameter Pareto-Levy, and the three-parameter Singh-Maddala distribution. A two-parameter log normal distribution appears to provide the best fit to our patented invention value data. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG Non-technical SummaryAssessing value of patent protection has long been a central issue in the economic literature studying the incentives for innovation in market economies. A number of authors have exploited a particular feature of many (though not all) national patent systems: the renewal fee structure. In many countries, patent holders need to pay annual renewal fees in order to keep patent protection in force. The fees are usually increasing over time in order to weed out less important patents. Using information on the timing of non-renewal, some studies have been able to infer the value of patent protection.However, these studies cannot use observable information on value differences among those patents that were renewed for the maximum duration of patent protection. But these are presumably the most important patented inventions. Since the valuation distributions are extremely skew, actually observed information in most renewal studies is only available on a small share of the total value of the overall national patent portfolio.We circumvent this problem by using a novel and more direct approach to the measurement of patent valuation. The paper focuses on the full-term patents of the application year 1977 held by West German and U.S. residents. For the German patents, a two-stage methodology was pursued. A preliminary telephone and telefax screening elicited patent value estimates and identified the most valuable patents, about which on-site interviews were then sought to develop more detailed historical information. For the U.S. patents, only an extended first stage was executed.Previous studies have found the distribution of patented invention values to be highly skew. We confirm this result, using actual information on the most valuable patents in the 1977 cohort. Several tests were conducted to pin down more precisely the nature of the high-value tail distribution. Three highly skew alternatives were evaluated by graphical and maximum likelihood techniques: the two-parameter log normal, the one-parameter ParetoLevy, and the three-parameter Singh-Maddala distribution. A two-parameter log normal distribution appears to provide the best fit to our patented invention value data.

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“…This idea is modeled in various ways in the endogenous growth literature. The obsolescence of private returns to R&D has been empirically addressed, using patent renewals, by Schankerman and Pakes (1986), Pakes (1986) and Lanjouw (1998). 3 Based on Mokyer ( 2005).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Knowledge Flow and Sequential Innovation: Implications for Technology Diffusion, R&D and Market Value

Belenzon

2006

SSRN Journal

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It is shown that spillovers can enhance private returns to innovation if they feed back into the dynamic research of the original inventor (Internalized spillovers), but will always reduce private returns, if the original inventor does not benefit from the advancements other inventors build into the "spilled" knowledge (Externalized spillovers). I empirically identify unique patterns of knowledge flows (based on patent citations), which provide information about whether "spilled" knowledge is reabsorbed by its inventor. A simple model of sequential innovation with dynamic spillovers is developed, which predicts that market value and R&D expenditures should rise with Internalized spillovers and fall with Externalized spillovers. These predications are confirmed using panel data on U.S. firms between 1981 and 2001. To the extent that firms internalize some of the spillovers they create, the classical underinvestment problem in R&D will be mitigated and the central role of spillovers in promoting economic growth will be enhanced.

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Estimates of the Value of Patent Rights in European Countries During the Post-1950 Period

Cited by 585 publications

References 11 publications

Institutionalized incentives for ingenuity—Patent value and the German Employees’ Inventions Act

Institutionalized incentives for ingenuity—Patent value and the German Employees’ Inventions Act

Exploring the Tail of Patented Invention Value Distributions

Knowledge Flow and Sequential Innovation: Implications for Technology Diffusion, R&D and Market Value

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