Ethics and the defense procurement system

Lansing, Paul; Burkard, Kimberly

doi:10.1007/bf00383237

Cited by 7 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…Rigorous audit programs gave way to de facto honor systems that relied heavily on self-regulation by third party vendors of goods and services. By the end of the 1970s, waste, fraud, and abuse in government programs had emerged as one of the most serious management problem facing public administration (Lansing & Burkard, 1991; Young, 1983).…”

Section: Public Corruption Whistleblowers Beware: Organizational Dissent After Garcettimentioning

confidence: 99%

Public Service, Public Corruption and the First Amendment

Roberts

2014

Review of Public Personnel Administration

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The 2006 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos imposed significant new restrictions on the First Amendment freedom of speech rights of public employees. Specifically, the Garcetti majority held that the First Amendment did not provide any protections for internal or external communications made in the course of performing their official duties. The 2014 case of Lane v. Franks provided the U.S. Supreme Court the opportunity to decide whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit properly denied First Amendment protection for testimony given by an employee of an Alabama community college who testified during a federal public corruption trial. The U.S. Supreme Court, by a vote of 9 to 0, held that Garcetti did not block the employee from proceeding with a claim that the community college retaliated against him for his trial testimony. The U.S. Supreme Court recognized a public corruption testimony exception to Garcetti.

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Section: Public Corruption Whistleblowers Beware: Organizational Dissent After Garcettimentioning

confidence: 99%

Public Service, Public Corruption and the First Amendment

Roberts

2014

Review of Public Personnel Administration

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“…But the management reforms adopted prior to World War II did not deal adequately with the ability of government contractors to cultivate friendships with government officials responsible for awarding and administering government contracts. Equally important, the increased use of competitive negotiations as an alternative to competitive bidding significantly increased the discretion of government contract officers over the contacting process (Lansing & Burkard, 1991). And with the increased discretion of contracting officers, the potential increased for financial conflicts of interest that could threaten public confidence in the integrity of the procurement process (Petrowitz, 1964).…”

Section: The Evolution Of Public Corruption Management and Defense Contractingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mandatory contractor codes of ethics and defense procurement integrity

Roberts

2010

Journal of Public Procurement

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The article examines the potential impact of FAR Subpart 3:10, Contractor Code of Business Ethics and Conduct on the system for regulating defense procurement integrity. The article argues that the adoption of the new Contractor Code of Business Ethics and Conduct will not change the already heavy emphasis placed on full compliance with criminal and civil statutes directed at protecting procurement integrity. The article also argues that the defense procurement integrity program should devote equal attention to adoption of non-criminal standards of conduct directed at assuring the impartiality and objectivity of contractor employees. Finally, the article argues that in order to rebuild public trust in contractor employees the FAR Council should require contractor employees who perform duties similar to full-time federal employees to comply with a new uniform set of non-criminal standards of conduct rules directed at assuring the impartiality and objectivity of contractor employees.

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“…There ensued many fines, civil recoveries, settlement agreements, reimbursements, and restitution payments amounting to over $2,000,000,000 (Mayer-Sommer andRoshwalb, 1996, p. 1260). Few defense contractors or contracting officers were convicted of fraud (Lansing and Burkard, 1991;New York Times 12 Nov. 1990, p. A1;Pasztor, 1995, p. 11). In response to the scandal, defense industry booster President Ronald Reagan appointed a Blue Ribbon Commission to study the problem.…”

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confidence: 95%