EU-China Security Relations: Discourse vs Practice and the Role of EU Member States

The Belt-and-Road Initiative as a paradigm change for European Union-China security cooperation? The case of Central Asia

“…On the other side of this spectrum, other EU-China scholars have long dismissed this superficial process of bilateral institution-building. The criticism purported here contends that the multiplicity of policy papers and dialogue mechanisms simply lead to the creation of considerable volumes of rhetoric while only generating paltry returns in terms of concrete actions (Holslag 2011 : 299, 309; Mattlin 2012 : 196; Montesano 2019 , 143; Smith and Xie 2010 : 438). These concrete actions would then translate into the empirical basis upon which the EU and China would breathe actual life into their Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.…”

“…The justification given in EU-China literature rationalising the association between differences in foreign policy identity and the unlikelihood of bilateral security cooperation contends that because both parties adopt non-identical lenses to interpret security concerns, their responses to security crises are likely to be diametrically opposed (Finamore 2017 : 165; Montesano 2019 : 143; Stumbaum 2007 : 352). For example, regarding debates on whether or not the international community should intervene in a given civil conflict, Beijing would expectedly call for the need to respect state sovereignty (even if the legitimacy of state rule has virtually evaporated), while the EU’s leaders are likely to call for the international community to intervene to ensure the protection of civilians (Barton 2017 : 49–55).…”

“…On one side of the spectrum pertaining to the liberal institutionalist approach are scholars who see value in institutional exchanges. These scholars see the benefits not only because of the possibilities it presents for ‘norm diffusion’ and the ‘reproduction of role identities’ but also because it has allowed the EU and China to realise the need for closer institutionalised bilateral cooperation on security matters (Ai and Song 2019 : 286; Montesano 2019 : 142; Stumbaum 2015 : 343). This was the case as argued by Ai and Song, for example, in relation to the bilateral recognition during high-level summit meetings for the EU3 and China to find a mutually acceptable agreement pertaining to the Iranian nuclear deal ( 2019 : 286).…”

“…Yet this belief in some form of incremental rapprochement on security cooperation has not been widely shared across the EU-China literature. Despite the obvious overlap of interests which China and the EU may share in this field, the bilateral propensity to convert these opportunities into examples of diplomatic alignment and/or practical cooperation is low (Li et al 2017 : 59; Montesano 2019 : 144). Rather this sentiment is the predominant one expressed across the spectrum of mainstream theories applicable to the study of EU-China relations.…”

Paradiplomacy and its Impact on EU Foreign Policy

“…Peace and security: as the EU aspire to promote a more open, sustainable and inclusive growth model in China, contacts on the sub-state level could enable the direct transfer of knowledge and best practices where they are needed, to local communities. In bypassing highly politicised dialogues on the state level, cities and regions could offer more channels for influencing Chinese society (Montesano 2019) and would often be independent of the turbulence between the political leaders.…”