EU Competition Law: Text, Cases, And Materials

Jones, Alison; Sufrin, Brenda; Dunne, Niamh

doi:10.2139/ssrn.3976852

Cited by 14 publications

(16 citation statements)

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“…Both the justification and the denial explanation put emphasis on “voluntary assent,” but the criteria of “coercion” does not necessarily subject the unilateral refusal or exclusionary conduct to antitrust liability except for the tying arrangement, where the lack of customer choice is sometimes described as “coercion” (Jones & Sufrin, 2011; p. 478) (e.g., Microsoft 24). But lack of counterparty choice is not the same as a lack of customer choice apparently, and focusing on it will black out the other antitrust standard of review—the competitive effects of vertical boycott under antitrust scrutiny of agreements.…”

Section: Platform Monopoly: Framework For Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

Rethinking the legal regulation of Internet platform monopoly in China

2022

Policy & Internet

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The existing regulatory regime for single firm exclusionary activity is primarily to establish a dominant position for a finding of an abuse, but there are challenges coming out of relevant market definition, market power determination, and the efficiency or innovation justifications. This paper argues for an alternative solution: an effects‐based analysis methodology for regulating platforms which are not proven to be dominant. Based on case studies including the Alibaba decision, JD.com case, Meituan case, and Visa case, it follows that we should stay focused on foreclosure effects while specifying the type of conduct that calls for careful scrutiny. But it is controversial to apply the traditional leverage theory and essential facilities doctrine to digital markets, which are of great significance to the determination of foreclosure effects. This paper introduces a “related markets hypothesis” to illustrate the leverage of market power, and applies a modified “costs‐based test” to determine whether the data resources held by the platform constitute a bottleneck. This paper finally proposes a classification scheme different from the criteria on a basis of company size. The decisive factors for classification include: form of platform enterprises, behavioral pattern, nature of market, market structure, and the competitive environment in related markets.

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Section: Platform Monopoly: Framework For Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

Rethinking the legal regulation of Internet platform monopoly in China

2022

Policy & Internet

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“…The US competition regime, set up by the 1890 Sherman Antitrust Act, initially sought to respond to public disquiet over the anticompetitive activities of large firms in the oil, steel and finance industry (McGuire and Smith, 2008). Initially, the regime was largely influenced by the Harvard School, which suggested that highly concentrated markets foreshadowed poor economic performance (Jones and Sufrin, 2016). The focus on the number and size of firms in the market led to the development of the famous 'SCP paradigm' in industrial organization (Kovacic and Shapiro, 2000: 52) predicting that market structure dictates firms' conduct which then impacts economic performance.…”

Section: The Origins Of the Us Competition Regime: From Harvard Schoo...mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Ordoliberalism thus advocated for regulatory intervention to avoid monopolized and cartelized markets (Monti, 2007). In effect, competition was regarded as the exercise of individual economic liberties legally sheltered from undue economic power (Jones and Sufrin, 2016). The emphasis on economic freedom implies the protection of competition as a valuable institution in itself.…”

Section: The Origins Of the Eu Competition Regime: The Freiburg Schoo...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Digital markets, competition regimes and models of capitalism: A comparative institutional analysis of European and US responses to Google

Kornelakis

Hublart²

2021

Competition & Change

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The comparative capitalism literature examined how institutions vary on a national or societal level and how these differences affect multinational companies’ strategies. Yet, little attention has been devoted to cross-national or regional differences in the governance of competition, especially in the context of digitalization of markets. The article seeks to fill this gap by looking at the case of Google. It traces the process of the stark US–EU disagreement over Google’s abuse of dominant position in digital markets, which resulted in one of the largest fines in the EU history. It is argued that the variation in the response to the company’s market and nonmarket strategies are traced back to differences between Ordoliberal and Chicago School ideas, which are embedded in the ‘competition regimes’ of European and US capitalist models. The article concludes by discussing the implications of these findings for varieties of capitalism frameworks.

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“…As can be derived from an earlier reform package (the 2005 State Aid Action Plan), the Commission prefers economy‐wide types of aid, so‐called horizontal aid, over aid targeted to specific sectors (vertical aid) (European Commission, 2005). Horizontal aids are considered to be better able to address market failures and create less market distortion (Jones and Sufrin, 2016, p. 138). Based on this, it is expected that the Commission will be less likely to ask critical questions or request additional information about planned horizontal aid.…”

Section: Theoretical Framework: Explaining Durationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Getting State Aid Approved by the European Commission: Explaining the Duration of Preliminary Investigations in the State Aid Notification Procedure*

Druenen

Zwaan

Mastenbroek

2021

J of Common Market Studies

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This article aims to explain the variation in duration of preliminary investigations in the state aid notification procedure. While this procedure is guided by objective standards, preliminary investigations result in an overwhelming majority of cases being approved in combination with a large variation in duration. This study explores the explanatory power of political and managerial factors at the member state and state aid case level to account for this variation. Based on multilevel regression analysis of a newly created dataset, results show that both political and managerial factors at the state aid case level affect the duration of preliminary investigations. No evidence was found for member state level factors having an effect.

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EU Competition Law: Text, Cases, And Materials

Cited by 14 publications

References 0 publications

Rethinking the legal regulation of Internet platform monopoly in China

Rethinking the legal regulation of Internet platform monopoly in China

Digital markets, competition regimes and models of capitalism: A comparative institutional analysis of European and US responses to Google

Getting State Aid Approved by the European Commission: Explaining the Duration of Preliminary Investigations in the State Aid Notification Procedure*

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