EU Competition Policy since 1990: How Substantial Is Convergence towards U.S. Antitrust?

Bartalevich, Dzmitry

doi:10.7835/jcc-berj-2013-0092

Cited by 3 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 46 publications

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“…The sources of convergence between the Chicago School of antitrust analysis and the Commission's view of EU competition law may be similar to the two centripetal forces pressing EU competition policy and US antitrust together in their treatment of antitrust issues. These two forces are transnational communication between the EU and US competition authorities (Bartalevich, , pp. 278, 283, 286) and dissemination of knowledge through the world's (elite) graduate programmes in economics that employ a generally common intellectual framework (Kovacic, , p. 332).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The blunt rejection of the Chicago School's influence on EU competition policy (Giocoli, ; Vallindas, ) and the lack of a more careful analysis of the Commission's input in EU competition law from the perspective of the Chicago School in the literature are unjust for two main reasons. First, EU competition policy converges with US antitrust in a number of pillars (Bartalevich, ; Kovacic, ). Taking into consideration the most resounding victory of the Chicago School in US antitrust (Crane, ; Pera, ) and its continuing influence on US antitrust (Stucke, ), it is pertinent that the gap in literature is addressed.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Influence of the Chicago School on the Commission's Guidelines, Notices and Block Exemption Regulations in EU Competition Policy

Bartalevich

2015

J of Common Market Studies

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Antitrust rules are fundamentally informed and shaped by economic theories. Given the significance of EU competition policy for the European integration process, it is essential to disentangle the economic theories underlying EU competition law. There is abundant theoretical and empirical literature examining the influence of ordoliberalism on EC/EU competition policy. However, in recent years, ordoliberal principles appear to have been replaced by neoliberalism and efficiency-enhancing rationale in EU competition policy. This article puts forward the idea of clarifying whether the European Commission incorporates Chicago School theory into EU competition law provisions. The analysis is carried out on the basis of the European Commission's guidelines, notices and block exemption regulations. The analysis reveals that the Commission does, to a considerable extent, follow the Chicago School theory. The elements of the Chicago School theory hold strongest in vertical practices; they are somewhat weaker in horizontal practices and in unilateral exclusionary conduct.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Influence of the Chicago School on the Commission's Guidelines, Notices and Block Exemption Regulations in EU Competition Policy

Bartalevich

2015

J of Common Market Studies

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Contextualizing corporate control in the agrifood and extractive sectors

Clapp

Purugganan

2020

Globalizations

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The argument for robust competition supervision in developing and transition countries

Emmert¹

2016

JGR

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The article discusses first the differences between market economic models, socialist or planned economies, and economies controlled by monopolies or cartels, to make the case for competition supervision. Subsequently it argues for a broad approach to competition super-vision - beyond a narrow view of antitrust law. The second part of the paper discusses monopoly or dominant position and the criteria to measure them. It reviews the reasons for merger control as a preventive step against monopoly or dominant position. Finally it discusses the issues related to collusion in the form of cartels and how to detect them. The third part of the paper focuses on the best ways for developing and transition countries to introduce or reinforce comprehensive competition supervision: Functioning institutions and how they have to be empowered and structured; priorities to be set; how competition oversight has to be embedded in the legal system, including court review; and why effective enforcement is so important and how it can be promoted. In an annex** there are links to some 75 countries which have newly introduced competition laws in the past 25 years and their legislative materials. Finally, there are links to another 30 countries which have substantially revised their legislative bases in the same time frame.

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EU Competition Policy since 1990: How Substantial Is Convergence towards U.S. Antitrust?

Cited by 3 publications

References 46 publications

The Influence of the Chicago School on the Commission's Guidelines, Notices and Block Exemption Regulations in EU Competition Policy

The Influence of the Chicago School on the Commission's Guidelines, Notices and Block Exemption Regulations in EU Competition Policy

Contextualizing corporate control in the agrifood and extractive sectors

The argument for robust competition supervision in developing and transition countries

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