2015
DOI: 10.1111/jcms.12292
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The Influence of the Chicago School on the Commission's Guidelines, Notices and Block Exemption Regulations in EU Competition Policy

Abstract: Antitrust rules are fundamentally informed and shaped by economic theories. Given the significance of EU competition policy for the European integration process, it is essential to disentangle the economic theories underlying EU competition law. There is abundant theoretical and empirical literature examining the influence of ordoliberalism on EC/EU competition policy. However, in recent years, ordoliberal principles appear to have been replaced by neoliberalism and efficiency-enhancing rationale in EU competi… Show more

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Cited by 28 publications
(10 citation statements)
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“…Hence, government is not the problem, but rather 'the solution to the problem, as long as it is the right kind of government' (Schnyder and Siems, 2013, p. 253), that is: one that shapes markets so that their regulation is not simply market-conforming, but rather market-shaping and competition-enforcing. This constitutes a crucial difference from the marketconforming, efficiency-seeking approach to regulation of the Chicago School tradition (Bartalevich, 2016). Additionally, not all forms of competition are perceived to be the same, with ordoliberals valuing 'achievement competition' over 'impediment competition' (Blyth, 2013, p. 137): rather than in a race to the bottom where regulatory impediments are removed one after another, competitiveness is better ensured through the quality of the goods and services produced, and the process ensuring that quality.…”
Section: An Ordoliberal Power? the Eu In Global Neoliberal Restrucmentioning
confidence: 95%
“…Hence, government is not the problem, but rather 'the solution to the problem, as long as it is the right kind of government' (Schnyder and Siems, 2013, p. 253), that is: one that shapes markets so that their regulation is not simply market-conforming, but rather market-shaping and competition-enforcing. This constitutes a crucial difference from the marketconforming, efficiency-seeking approach to regulation of the Chicago School tradition (Bartalevich, 2016). Additionally, not all forms of competition are perceived to be the same, with ordoliberals valuing 'achievement competition' over 'impediment competition' (Blyth, 2013, p. 137): rather than in a race to the bottom where regulatory impediments are removed one after another, competitiveness is better ensured through the quality of the goods and services produced, and the process ensuring that quality.…”
Section: An Ordoliberal Power? the Eu In Global Neoliberal Restrucmentioning
confidence: 95%
“…According to this perspective, competition has been a central policy area where convergence with the EU can be observed. According to some scholars, this regulatory convergence is manifested through the EU competition regime steadily becoming more similar to the Chicago neoliberal paradigm (Bartalevich, 2016;Buch-Hansen and Wigger, 2010;Wigger and N€ olke, 2007). Historically, this can be traced to the process of 'soft convergence', when US experts collaborated with Europeans in the drafting of abuse of market power clauses in the European Coal and Steel Community (Djelic, 2002).…”
Section: Regulatory Convergence or Transatlantic Divergence?mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Clearly other influences can also be traced. In this debate, see, for example, Akman, 2014;Karagiannis, 2013, who argue that its influence has been exaggerated; and Bartalevich, 2016;Talbot, 2016; Warlouzet 2010 for the more nuanced view that ordo-liberalism has been influential, but that competition law has also been shaped by other factors. For the purpose of this contribution there is no need to precisely trace the exact impact.…”
Section: The Ordo-liberal Roots Of European Competition Lawmentioning
confidence: 99%