Europa im Parteienwettstreit in den Ausschüssen des Bundesrates

Souris, Antonios

doi:10.5771/0720-5120-2018-3-210

Cited by 1 publication

(1 citation statement)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Third, civil servants who are involved in everyday legislative work share a similar professional understanding of their job and can moderate party ideological conflicts within bureaucratic networks. Recent research reveals a moderate party politicisation in the Bundesrat committees which prepare Bundesrat votes (Souris 2018). They share a strong identity as neutral experts in their respective policy fields.…”

Section: Coordination and Cooperation: Making Administrative Federalism Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Administrative Federalism

Behnke

Kropp

2021

Governance and Public Management

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The German federal architecture is shaped by a peculiar mix of strong decentralisation and high autonomy at lower levels of government coupled with an administrative culture of uniformity, solidarity and coordination. This system has been described as ‘administrative federalism’ to emphasise the prominent role of executives and administrations in policymaking and policy implementation. The federal level relies on the Länder for executing its tasks; in turn, the Länder executives possess rights of co-decision in federal legislation via the Bundesrat. While formal jurisdictions are strongly decentralised, a dense web of interlocking powers and processes, as well as institutions of coordination, creates incentives for territorial governments to closely cooperate with each other. The German-style administrative federalism has been successful, but is requiring adaptation and developments caused by trends like the upward shift of tasks from the Länder to the federal level and increasing party-system fragmentation.

show abstract

Section: Coordination and Cooperation: Making Administrative Federalism Workmentioning

confidence: 99%