European agencies and their boards: promises and pitfalls of accountability beyond design

Busuioc, Madalina

doi:10.1080/13501763.2011.646785

Cited by 33 publications

(33 citation statements)

References 24 publications

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“…Most of the boards are formally responsible for making overall management and budget decisions, such as the appointment and/or dismissal of the agency head, the setting of an annual plan or approval of the work program, and the adoption and supervision of the budget. The composition of the management boards varies but, in general, boards can include representatives of the member states and the Commission and, in some cases, representatives of the EP, non‐EU countries, other EAs, and stakeholders (see Busuioc ). In addition, I also analyze the formal involvement of interest groups in the “stakeholder groups” and “advisory/expert forums.” Not all EAs have provisions to include these bodies.…”

Section: Delegation Of Tasks and Powers To European Union Agencies (Ementioning

confidence: 99%

Interest group representation in the formal design of European Union agencies

Durán

2017

Regulation & Governance

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This article examines the decision to include interest group representation (IGR) in the most important decisionmaking bodies of European Union agencies (EAs). The study shows that there is considerable variation among agencies: some agencies have no IGR, others have formal rules that establish a clear distribution of the number of representatives among stakeholders, while other agencies are ambiguous with regard to the number of representatives that each group should have. In addition, interest group representatives have the right to vote in some of the agencies with IGR, while in others they only have an advisory role. This article identifies three broad types of groups normally represented: representatives of capital (e.g. industry), representatives of labor (e.g. trade unions), and citizens' representatives (e.g. non‐governmental organizations, consumer groups). The findings suggest that informative agencies are more likely to have IGR than agencies performing operational/management tasks. The findings also suggest that the involvement of the European Parliament in the design of EAs is more likely to lead to a provision for the representation of stakeholders. Finally, case studies of the European Food Safety Agency and the European Agency for Safety and Health at Work demonstrate that interest groups could play an important role by pushing European Union institutions to include stakeholder representatives in EAs.

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Section: Delegation Of Tasks and Powers To European Union Agencies (Ementioning

confidence: 99%

Interest group representation in the formal design of European Union agencies

Durán

2017

Regulation & Governance

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“…Very few empirical studies have examined these vertical relationships, and especially MBs, in depth. Two exceptions are the recent articles by Busuioc (2012) and Suvarierol et al (2013). However, these articles, although dealing with MBs, have a different level of analysis from this article.…”

Section: How To Study and Assess These Vertical Relationshipsmentioning

confidence: 78%

“…Very few empirical studies have examined these vertical relationships, and especially MBs, in depth. Two exceptions are the recent articles by Busuioc () and Suvarierol et al . ().…”

Section: Euas' Vertical Relationships From An Accountability and Contmentioning

confidence: 99%

Accountable and Under Control? Explaining Governments' Selection of Management Board Representatives

Buess

2014

J of Common Market Studies

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The role of national representatives on the management boards (MBs) of European Union agencies (EUAs) is crucial in two respects. From a democratic point of view, national MB representatives' accountability may constitute a possible additional source of legitimacy for these technocratic bodies. From the perspective of European integration, their relationship with national institutions tells us about the status of EUAs and the extent to which their MBs constitute an intergovernmental control tool in the hands of the Member States. Contrary to their formal design, the collected data suggest that MBs have a rather supranational, technocratic character. With regard to their contribution to EUAs' democratic accountability, although the general level of accountability is high, the findings are more diverse. However, rather than reflecting control intentions by the Member States, different levels of accountability can best be explained by functional and institutional rather than strategic factors.

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“…Accordingly, studies have documented that government representatives attending EU-agency management boards often meet relatively ill-prepared. Combined with few board meetings and considerable size of the meetings (often more than 40 attendees), management boards are deemed not that effective in overseeing and controlling the activities of EU agencies (Busuioc 2012;.…”

Section: Accounting For the Relationship: An Organizational Perspectivementioning

confidence: 99%

The quest for order: unravelling the relationship between the European Commission and European Union agencies

Egeberg¹,

Trondal²,

Vestlund³

2014

Journal of European Public Policy

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Over the past couple of decades a considerable number of European Union (EU) agencies have been established. Research has so far shown that they have become more than mere facilitators of transnational regulatory networks, arenas for the exchange of information on 'best practice', and vehicles for member state governments. Task expansion has taken place, e.g., by taking up (quasi-) regulatory tasks. However, the jury is still out regarding exactly where in the political-administrative landscape EU agencies are situated. Benefiting from novel data sources, this study sheds light on so far undocumented relationships between EU agencies and the European Commission. The study shows that EU agencies have become integral components in the policy-making and implementation activities of Commission departments. Secondly, this development is accounted for by an organizational approach that specifies a set of organizational factors. The study argues that such tight relationships between Commission departments and EU agencies signify a centralization of EU executive power.

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European agencies and their boards: promises and pitfalls of accountability beyond design

Cited by 33 publications

References 24 publications

Interest group representation in the formal design of European Union agencies

Interest group representation in the formal design of European Union agencies

Accountable and Under Control? Explaining Governments' Selection of Management Board Representatives

The quest for order: unravelling the relationship between the European Commission and European Union agencies

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