European participation in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: making strategic choice and seeking economic opportunities

Chen, Ian Tsung-yen

doi:10.1007/s10308-017-0498-x

Cited by 7 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…While the latter provides China with financial support for the logistical implementation of the BRI globally, the AIIB has also revealed the fragility of transatlantic cohesion. Despite the Obama Administration's vehemently discouraging EU Member States from joining the AIIB, to Washington's surprise, 14 EU Member States ultimately became part of the institution [11]. Moreover, the process of joining the AIIB also exposed Brussels' lack of coordination and vision concerning the BRI.…”

Section: China's Multilateralism: Signs and Evidencementioning

confidence: 99%

Multilateralism and Soft Power Made-in-China: (re)Adjusting Role Conception to Meet International Expectations

Duarte,

Gupta,

Delvaje

2024

East Asia

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This article addresses the specificities of the new multilateralism made-in-China under Xi Jinping. We argue that China has been investing in a combination of Soft Power and Multilateralism to foster a friendly worldwide environment whilst promoting China’s geopolitical reemergence. Drawing on role theory, we assess whether there has been a shifting trend on China’s soft power and multilateralism, to cope both with international expectations on China’s new role and China’s own role conception. We conclude that China’s gradual turn towards multilateralism and soft power is a complementary strategy to China’s longstanding use of bilateralism. It provides China with new institutions and ways to prosper as Chinese interests are no longer effectively fulfilled within the old Bretton Woods system. This article aims to deepen the existing literature on China’s soft power, whilst highlighting the novel developments in China’s multilateral initiatives and soft power including the impact of EU’s de-risking approach toward China – not yet addressed by current studies.

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Section: China's Multilateralism: Signs and Evidencementioning

confidence: 99%

Multilateralism and Soft Power Made-in-China: (re)Adjusting Role Conception to Meet International Expectations

Duarte,

Gupta,

Delvaje

2024

East Asia

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“…The third factor gives more attention to participating Western countries, not least traditional US allies, and zeros in on the politico‐economic‐normative calculus behind their decision to join the AIIB. The motives discussed include hedging amid heightened US‐China strategic rivalry, pursuing business opportunities attendant on infrastructure investment and pushing China to institute high standards (Chen, 2018; Gabsui, 2019; Jang, 2022). Undoubtedly, the calculus of these countries was related to the outcome of US‐China jostling over the AIIB.…”

Section: Situating the Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

Rhetorical coercion, institutional legitimacy and the creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank

Yang¹

2023

Global Policy

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This article centres around one singular yet substantively important empirical puzzle: why did the United States fail to delegitimate the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank? I argue that a crucial factor missing from existing analyses is China's rhetorical coercion. To substantiate this argument, I first reconstruct from the perspective of framing the US‐China rhetorical contestation over the AIIB at the early stage. This results in the identification of seven competing frames pertaining to the purpose and procedural legitimacy of the bank: Sub‐standard, Tool and Rival promoted by the United States; High‐quality, Equality, Complement and Welcome Change by China. To flesh out China's rhetorical coercion, I gauge the coercive power of the frames identified before zooming in on Complement and Welcome Change and uncovering therein three coercive claims: shortfalls in Asia's infrastructure finance, weaknesses in the existing system of international financial institutions and inconsistency in the US approach to the AIIB and China's rise. These claims considerably restricted the room for the United States to engage in principled opposition, and in tandem with developments favourable to the AIIB (not least the participation of Western countries), enabled China to rhetorically coerce the United States.

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“…Therefore, they readily enrolled in the new China-led diplomatic and institution-building initiative, despite the US warnings about Beijing's attempt to divide the Western camp (Le Corre 2015), and they hoped that by joining the AIIB as "Founding Members", their companies would then have privileged access to the infrastructure market in Asia, and more economic opportunities with China (Nicolas and Di Meglio 2015). Moreover, from an international security perspective, European countries facing growing uncertainty with the United States in their traditional security alliance, and appearing to be increasingly dependent, economically, on the fast-growing Asian markets for their future growth potential were more likely to join the Bank (Chen 2018). Finally, the UK, Luxembourg, Germany and France all wanted to promote their respective financial centers (London, Luxembourg, Frankfurt, and Paris) as Chinese currency trading hubs for renminbi-denominated foreign exchange products and financial assets (Chin 2017).…”

Section: Why the Europeans Joinedmentioning

confidence: 99%

Global Standards in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: The Contribution of the European Members

Gabusi

2019

Global Policy

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In 2015, seventeen European states joined the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) as Founding Members. France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom, among the group, have the largest share of capital and votes, giving them significant voice in the Bank. The purpose of the European members in joining was mainly twofold: (i) to help increase financial flows available for investment infrastructure in Asia; and (ii) to help ensure that the new Bank would adhere to global financial, environmental and social standards, as established by the existing Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs). It can be said that the Europeans have largely succeeded. Existing MDBs have served as models for the standards which the AIIB is institutionalizing. However, some European-based civil society organizations are increasingly critical of the operations of the AIIB. Moreover, some developing countries may see the AIIB's standards as an unnecessary burden. It can therefore not be assumed that the AIIB will continue to expand its portfolio by merely complementing the existing MDBs.In July 2019, the 4 th Annual Meeting of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) was convened -for the very first time outside Asia -in Luxembourg. The international financial hub was also the first European country to announce its intention to join the AIIB ('the Bank' in this article) on March 11 th 2015, one day before the United Kingdom 1 . During the opening session in Luxembourg, Xavier Bettel, the Prime Minister of the host country, recalled his decision to join or not to join the AIIB as 'not an easy one' 2 . In the end, Luxembourg joined because, in addition to believing in Asia and multilateralism, the Prime Minister also still believes that 'economy and ecology are not enemies'. Then, in an address to more than 3,000 delegates, observers and participants to the meeting, the Grand Duke of Luxembourg described the AIIB as an institution in line with the multilateral approach that the world has come to know since Bretton Woods and that has been serving post-WWII Europe so well. He emphasized that only international co-operation leads to economic, social and political development, and that the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (United Nations Assembly 2015) are 'a common duty and responsibility' for all. Finally, AIIB president Jin Liqun remarked that the Bank embodies European values, has zero tolerance for corruption, and supports the green economy -hence its motto 'lean, clean and green', and reflecting operational efficiency, transparent working methods, and commitment to sustainable development. Jin importantly acknowledged the Europeans' contribution in bringing to the Bank the same governance structures to be found in the existing Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs), in which European states are members and participants (i.e. all of the major MDBs) 3 . This essay asks what is Europe's role in the AIIB, what interests and agendas are European member-states pursuing, what vision of future priorities are the Europea...

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European participation in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: making strategic choice and seeking economic opportunities

Cited by 7 publications

References 11 publications

Multilateralism and Soft Power Made-in-China: (re)Adjusting Role Conception to Meet International Expectations

Multilateralism and Soft Power Made-in-China: (re)Adjusting Role Conception to Meet International Expectations

Rhetorical coercion, institutional legitimacy and the creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank

Global Standards in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: The Contribution of the European Members

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