European Telecoms Regulation: Past Performance and Prospects

Gual, Jordi; Jódar-Rosell, Sandra

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199566358.003.0009

Cited by 5 publications

(4 citation statements)

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“…The Commission directives require that interconnection and access rates should be based on costs, leaving a fair return on the capital invested, but not specifying the methodologies for calculating these costs or the level of fair return. (Gual & Jòdar-Rosell, 2009). access prices that take economic principles into account, namely, "the efficient component pricing rule -ECPR 5 " and the approach evoked by the Ramsay 6 principle.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cost Method Effectiveness Analyses Case Study – Fixed Telecommunication in Albania

2020

ISJ-Monte

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The fundamental problem in the Telecommunications market, which contributes to slowing down the competition, reclines in the local and central necessary network access, capable to offer regulated services. In order, to overcome to stimulate competition in the telecommunications market effectively, the European Commission intervened with a series of directives forcing the only notable operators who own the network, to provide regulated access. This regulation was then extended to all of the operators with the significant market power. The national regulatory authority is the authority that determines the right access price to encourage downstream competition and at the same time encourage the prospects of new operators to build their own infrastructure. Different methodologies are used to allocate costs for calculating access prices by national regulatory authority in European countries. They use accounting methods, preferring them over what economic theory advises, however these methods are affected by a variety of limitation. The telecommunications sectors in Albania comprise a similar situation that deserves the attention of operators, regulators and academics. This sector is subject to ex ante regulation and access regulation is of public interest. It is therefore of strategic importance to find the right balance between promoting competitions in the short term -allowing new operators to enter in the market -and promoting long-term competitionthrough appropriate incentives to invest in alternative infrastructure. The research is based in qualitative method. There is no information on the costs of operators and their calculations but a qualitative analysis of the collected facts as well as a qualitative analysis of the author based on her background. Primary sources are obtained from documents published by the regulator and operators, legal and sub-legal acts; secondary data are collected from various scientific and professional articles and publications of academics and researchers, also books and regulatory documents of other countries. Electronic and Postal Communications is the Albanian regulator Authority that verifies the compliance of the regulated rates with the method and conditions set for the regulation of the rates. Even though since 2010 the Albanian regulatory has formally accepted the application of the Bottom-up Long-Run Incremental Cost method, it continues to apply a Benchmark model with reference to the rates calculated by the regulators of the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications countries. So there has been no evidence of data being used to do a complete research in order to decide whether the results obtained by using the Benchmark model would have been more / less consistent and more / less efficient than those obtained from using the Bottom-up Long-Run Incremental Cost model (cost-oriented model). The author concludes that the regulatory complies with the requirements of the law, but with limited application, it implements the minimum / maximum average rate model of ...

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cost Method Effectiveness Analyses Case Study – Fixed Telecommunication in Albania

2020

ISJ-Monte

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“…entrants' ability to compete, and can consequently maintain its dominant position even after legal barriers to entry are eliminated. In this context, at least in the early stages of liberalization, regulation and ex-ante intervention can play a major role in governing the transition to effective competition (Gual and Jodar-Rosell, 2009). If the liberalization process follows a rapid and cumulative pace, then, the presence of such complementary institutions might become crucial even to the success of the entire reforms course.…”

Section: Complementarities Between Liberalization and Nrasmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This asynchronous adoption of liberalization reforms and regulatory authorities can be explained by the fact that in Europe the traditional control of monopolies by governments has restrained until recently the feeling that independent mechanisms of regulation could have been necessary (Geradin, 2000). Moreover, the reorganization of the telecommunications industry was to a certain extent an experimentation process, in which best institutional practices tended to be adopted at first by a few countries, and in which such practices spread across jurisdictions only after they have proved to be successful in the first mover states (McCahery et al, 1996;Gual and Jodar-Rosell, 2009). As a result, competitive market structures in European telecommunications emerged, on average, with a slower pace than that at which liberalization initiatives were implemented.…”

Section: Ideologyi Tmentioning

confidence: 99%

Liberalizing telecommunications in Europe: path dependency and institutional complementarities

Belloc¹,

Nicita²,

Parcu³

2013

Journal of European Public Policy

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We empirically investigate the nature and outcomes of the liberalization process in European telecommunications. First, we show that decisions to liberalize a country´s telecommunications sector have followed a path dependent and cumulative pace. Moreover, we investigate the extent to which path-dependency might have forced liberalizations, regardless of the creation of complementary institutions governing promarket outcomes. We find that the impact of liberalizations on competition is strongly enhanced by the establishment of complementary institutions, such as the national regulatory authority. Our findings contribute to the existing literature by outlining the role played by path dependency and institutional complementarities in the process of European liberalization. Our conclusions may provide useful lessons for the optimal policy design of pro-market policies in those European network industries that still wait for substantial liberalization.

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“…The first two packages combined implied more harmonization (clearly useful for technical standards) than market integration. Gual and Jodar (2007) provide a useful summary of the results achieved under the current system.…”

Section: Telecommunicationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Electricity and Telecoms Reforms in the EU: Insights from the Economics of Federalism

Trillas

2010

SSRN Journal

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European Telecoms Regulation: Past Performance and Prospects

Cited by 5 publications

References 0 publications

Cost Method Effectiveness Analyses Case Study – Fixed Telecommunication in Albania

Cost Method Effectiveness Analyses Case Study – Fixed Telecommunication in Albania

Liberalizing telecommunications in Europe: path dependency and institutional complementarities

Electricity and Telecoms Reforms in the EU: Insights from the Economics of Federalism

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