Europeanising Antitrust: British Competition Policy Reform and Member State Convergence

Abstract

This article argues that the patterns of competition policy convergence in EU member states challenge formulations of the process of Europeanisation and specifically the notion that the likelihood of policy harmonisation is a function of the pre-existing compatibility or 'fit' between national and supranational policies. In the case of antitrust, the member states in which existing arrangements were least compatible with the European policy were generally the first to adopt the European competition enforcement regime, while Britain, in spite of having an established-albeit dysfunctional-competition regime since the 1940s, was the last of the medium-and large-sized members to move towards harmonising its antitrust rules. The article finds that the pre-existence of an antitrust system actually made harmonisation more difficult for Britain by allowing British industrial interests to develop preferences for the domestic system, which stymied attempts to Europeanise British policy.

Transferts institutionnels et politiques de concurrence

“…Entre 1997 et 1998 ces trois obstacles se trouvent rapidement renversés. Pendant que les juristes britanniques commencent à s'adapter au droit communautaire, ce sont surtout les représentants de la CBI qui modifient leurs préférences pour devenir les supporters d'une réforme et une meilleure intégration de la politique britannique dans celle de l'UE (Baldi, 2006). Enfin, en prenant appui sur ces changements de problématisation du gouvernement de la concurrence, le nouvel exécutif travailliste s'est empressé de légiférer en 1998 (The Competition Act) et encore en 2002 (The Enterprise Act).…”

Reinforcing Each Other: How the Combination of European and Domestic Reforms Increased Competition in Liberalized Industries

“…Although the significance of the Commission in promoting competition cannot be denied, Gutierrez and Philippon's (2023) limited role attributed to domestic actors appears to be overly minimalistic, failing to capture the historical institutional variability that has long characterized European domestic competition regimes (Doern and Waarden and Drahos, 2002;Baldi, 2006;Guidi, 2014;Warlouzet, 2016;Ergen and Kohl, 2019). This institutional variability frequently manifested in divergent reform trajectories and varying economic outcomes, with certain countries displaying greater willingness to liberalize their economies compared to others (Héritier, 1997;Humphreys and Padgett, 2006;Schuster et al (2013), and competition statistics evolving unevenly across different economies (Christopoulou and Vermeulen, 2012;Cook, 2011;De Loecker and Eeckhout, 2018).…”