Euroscepticism and the Future of European Integration

Abstract

The European Union (EU) is facing one of the rockiest periods in its existence. At no time in its history has it looked so economically fragile, so insecure about how to protect its borders, so divided over how to tackle the crisis of legitimacy facing its institutions, and so under assault by Eurosceptic parties. The unprecedented levels of integration in recent decades have led to increased public contestation, yet at the same the EU is more reliant on public support for its continued legitimacy than ever before. This book examines the role of public opinion in the European integration process. It develops a novel theory of public opinion that stresses the deep interconnectedness between people’s views about European and national politics. It suggests that public opinion cannot simply be characterized as either Eurosceptic or not, but rather that it consists of different types. This is important because these types coincide with fundamentally different views about the way the EU should be reformed and which policy priorities should be pursued. These types also have very different consequences for behaviour in elections and referendums. Euroscepticism is such a diverse phenomenon because the Eurozone crisis has exacerbated the structural imbalances within the EU. As the economic and political fates of member states have diverged, people’s experiences with and evaluations of the EU and national political systems have also grown further apart. The heterogeneity in public preferences that this book has uncovered makes a one-size-fits-all approach to addressing Euroscepticism unlikely to be successful.

Benchmarking Brexit: How the British Decision to Leave Shapes EU Public Opinion

“…While these approaches have greatly contributed to our understanding of public support and scepticism towards the EU, they provide us with little guidance about how the outcome of the Brexit vote might affect public support for Europe. As I have argued elsewhere (De Vries, ), public opinion towards the EU is best understood with reference to benchmarks. My benchmark theory suggests that people's attitudes towards Europe are ultimately rooted in a comparison, namely a comparison between the benefits of the current status quo of membership with those associated with an alternative state of one's country being outside the EU.…”

“…This has already proven an important touchstone of dissent within electoral campaigns in some member states and was a central issue in the Brexit campaign (Clarke et al ., , see also Kriesi et al ., ). Other perceived costs that have been highlighted by eurosceptic pundits are that countries have to accept the jurisdiction of the European Court, or engage in some forms of financial guarantees, transfer payments or debt relief efforts, for example, through membership in the eurozone (De Vries, ).…”

Don't Mention the War! Second World War Remembrance and Support for European Cooperation

“…Why exposure to the vignette triggered a response to financial aid but not to cooperation in other policy areas is an important area for future research. I have suggested that this may be due to the largely transactional nature of public opinion (De Vries, ), but the extent to which this is the case will be an important avenue for further investigation. The evidence provided here also raises interesting questions about how perceptions of a shared European history may help us to understand the contours of public opinion towards European integration and the conditions under which they do.…”

“…Studies have demonstrated that people benchmark the alternative state by extrapolating from current national conditions, specifically national economic performance and quality of government (De Vries, ). Similarly, the alternative state can be benchmarked based on previous precedents of other countries leaving, especially the UK's experiences with Brexit (De Vries, , ). Support for European integration and cooperation is higher when people think that they or their country would be worse off under the alternative state scenario.…”

Braving the Waves? Europe's Constitutional Settlement at Twenty

“…This is why those who fear the shift towards 'existential' (or constitutional) euroscepticism should be especially attuned to 'policy euroscepticism' (De Vries, 2018). This is all the more true if we believe that the EU's illadaptability to shocks is due to bad policies rather than bad constitutional design.…”