2011
DOI: 10.1080/13608741003594353
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Euroscepticism in Turkey: Parties, Elites, and Public Opinion

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Cited by 56 publications
(34 citation statements)
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“…It is a concern about the continuity of the Turkish nation‐state order that interprets new developments, such as the BOP, as a danger. This is parallel to the previous studies on the Sèvres syndrome, which indicate that currently the political Islamists and nationalists use the syndrome in their reactions to the changes related to globalization, the EU, and increasing human rights discourse in the country (Göçek, ; Yılmaz, ). Moreover, Göçek () and Yılmaz () mention the DTP and the AKP as the opposite side and unlikely to propagate the Sèvres syndrome.…”
Section: Discussionsupporting
confidence: 84%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…It is a concern about the continuity of the Turkish nation‐state order that interprets new developments, such as the BOP, as a danger. This is parallel to the previous studies on the Sèvres syndrome, which indicate that currently the political Islamists and nationalists use the syndrome in their reactions to the changes related to globalization, the EU, and increasing human rights discourse in the country (Göçek, ; Yılmaz, ). Moreover, Göçek () and Yılmaz () mention the DTP and the AKP as the opposite side and unlikely to propagate the Sèvres syndrome.…”
Section: Discussionsupporting
confidence: 84%
“…This is parallel to the previous studies on the Sèvres syndrome, which indicate that currently the political Islamists and nationalists use the syndrome in their reactions to the changes related to globalization, the EU, and increasing human rights discourse in the country (Göçek, ; Yılmaz, ). Moreover, Göçek () and Yılmaz () mention the DTP and the AKP as the opposite side and unlikely to propagate the Sèvres syndrome. Primarily, because both political parties use these accounts to voice their anxieties about Turkish society, emerging from the Sèvres syndrome, the ontological insecurities of the MHP and the SP appear to be the genesis of the conspiratorial theories on the Dönmes.…”
Section: Discussionsupporting
confidence: 84%
“…The local factors which shape this perception can include 'cognitive' and/or 'normative priors' (Björkdahl et al, 2015 p. 5), otherwise also referred to as 'cultural filters' (Manners, 2002) based on 'historically constructed domestic norms' (Checkel, 1999, p. 87). Here, such priors would include the continued existence of the Sèvres syndrome, as also previously identified by Yılmaz (2011), which runs the risk of undermining the EU's normativity in the Turkish context, or the perceived cultural and religious incompatibility, also observed in Yılmaz's (2011) earlier data, which is used in countering arguments on the significance of the EU's normative impact. Yet, the data show that in the Turkish case, the notion of 'cultural filter' needs to be expanded to account for the government/opposition dynamics concerning the state of democracy in the country.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 97%
“…Another type of ethical‐political argumentation used in de‐legitimizing the EU, while rarely used to directly contest arguments in favour of the EU's normativity, relates to the fears of territorial partition by the Western powers that surface widely across the Turkish public, also referred to as the Sèvres syndrome in Yılmaz's () earlier work on Euroscepticism in Turkey, as expressed in the following:
…”
Section: Findings: How Does the Turkish Public Justify The Eu?mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…While EU membership remained at the level of a theoretical or macro project, what society at large thought about EU accession seemed not to be of great concern by the political elites, and the leaders of the mainstream parties generally favoured a westward focus. Since acceptance of candidacy in 1999 and particularly since negotiations have formally commenced in 2005 (Yılmaz 2011), the nitty-gritty details of reform that touch on sensitive social issues have given political opponents opportunity to create social discomfort toward the idea of EU accession and its 'impositions' on the national status quo. 2 Thus, it is important to consider how changes in domestic politics and competition among political elites might impact attitudes toward the EU.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%