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While the matter that the Ottomans had established an independent state or not, based on "coin (sikke)" and "hutbe", has been tried to be solved thanks to an undated coin belonging to Othman Ghazi published by İbrahim Artuk in 1980, the basic design of that coin and its unavailable sample has continued to arouse some suspicion on this subject. In the same time, another second coin belonging to Othman Ghazi, which is said to have been existing in the collection of illustrious numismatist Nicholas Lowick, but whose origin, other than its only one part legible, is not known, has been clarified thanks to its photos recently published by us; it is clear that this coin was minted in Söğüt, in 699/1300, in the same way as the Ilkhanate's ones, but differently from the other one, and that it contains very important evidences that may lighten some disputed subjects on the establishment of Ottomans. In this our last study that is such as to complete our findings related to these two coins, by introducing another third coin, in Doha Museum, in Katar, belonging to Othman Ghazi, which was published by a German numismatist, but not known to history scholars, it aims to try to explain the concluding phase of Othman Ghazi's allegiance and independence in the light of the third coin, the establishing era of Yenişehir mint, and to clarify some disputes about the independence focused on Ilkhanate's dominance; and to present new and important findings about the first coin of Othman Ghazi, in respect to the physical features of the last two coins.

During the interwar years, U.S.-Turkish relations had been confined within the boundaries of conventional diplomacy. By the end of World War II, the Truman Doctrine of 1947 and the military assistance agreement that drew on it marked the beginning of a series of bilateral and multilateral agreements that bound the two nations together in the military as well as political, economic, and cultural fields. However, relations between the two states did not always proceed on a smooth path. Hence, the relatively optimistic, formative years of 1947-1960 were followed by the troublesome decades of the 1960s and 1970s. By the 1980s, mutual relations settled back on an upward track, reaching a peak during the Gulf War of 1990-91. With the demise of the Soviet system, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, and the end of the Cold War, some commentators expected the eventual dismantling of NATO and with it the waning of the American connections with Turkey. Turkey's “strategic value” in the eyes of the Americans, it was being argued, would necessarily diminish as the Soviet threat-the main component of this “value”-was disappearing. Developments throughout the 1990s, however, did not fully justify those pessimistic scenarios. In fact, by the mid-1990s, Turkey and the United States, with the occasional participation of other states such as Israel, began to build a so-called strategic partnership to contain regional and local threats (arising in the areas surrounding Turkey and ranging from the Balkans to the Middle East and the Caucasus) that had been unleashed by the destabilizing forces of the post-Cold War period. It should be noted that, during about the same period, U.S.-Turkish relations gained unprecedented new dimensions, economic and cultural, complementing and sometimes overshadowing the military one.