In recent years, an increasing number of regional and bilateral trade agreements have emerged that include provisions on labor standards. The claimed purpose of these labor provisions is to improve working conditions in developing and emerging economies. However, little is known about whether such provisions actually do impact working conditions. This paper conducts an econometric study on the effectiveness of labor provisions in trade agreements. In particular, we evaluate the impact of the 1999 Bilateral Textile Agreement between Cambodia and the United States (CUSBTA) on both the gender wage gap and discrimination. The agreement combined the incentive of higher exports with the obligation of textile manufacturers to comply with international core labor standards, which include the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation. Using data from the Cambodia Socioeconomic Survey and applying a difference-in-difference estimation, we find a statistically significant reduction of the gender wage gap in the textile sector that can be attributed to the CUSBTA.
| INTRODUCTIONEfforts to promote global trade on the multilateral level through the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) have not produced much progress over the last decade. At the same time, the number of regional and bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) has increased significantly. While the proliferation of FTAs has been well documented (see, for example, Egger and Larch, 2008;Baldwin, 2012;Kohl, Brakman, and Garretsen, 2016;ILO, 2016), less attention has been given to the fact DOI: 10.1111 that a rising number of North-South agreements contain certain legal clauses on labor standards (so-called "labor provisions").
1The purpose of the inclusion of labor provisions is usually the claim that minimum standards on labor are needed to share the benefits of globalization with the workforce in developing countries through higher wages and better working conditions. Besides the long-standing theoretical arguments for or against labor provisions in FTAs, and whether they promote development or are hidden forms of protectionism, 2 another important question remains unanswered: there exists basically no empirical evidence on whether labor provisions actually have an effect on working conditions in developing countries when included in a trade agreement or not. There are several reasons for this lack of empirical evidence. Firstly, while the theoretical debate about the potential impact of labor provisions is quite old, the actual inclusion of labor provisions in trade agreements is a relative new phenomenon. In most of these cases, there is simply not enough data available to conduct such empirical analysis. Secondly, labor provisions in trade agreements are quite diverse and may affect a variety of working conditions in different ways, which, in turn, would make it difficult to generalize their potential impacts on working conditions. Instead, analyses need to be made for specific working conditions that can be measured. Finally, there ex...