Evaluating the efficacy and equity of environmental stopgap measures

Who Is Paying for Carbon Dioxide Removal? Designing Policy Instruments for Mobilizing Negative Emissions Technologies

“…The readiness of, and support for CDR approaches varies widely from already implemented and low-regret (e.g., restoring mangrove vegetation) to low or unknown (in particular open-ocean-based) approaches [see Honegger et al (2020) for an assessment of the impacts of various CDR approaches on the Sustainable Development Goals, Gattuso et al (2021)]. At least three rationales are frequently put forward for considering CDR in public policy (Geden and Schenuit, 2020;Morrow et al, 2020): (a) balancing out residual emissions from effectively-impossible-to-decarbonize sectors (like agriculture) for achieving a permanent steady state of net-zero emissions, (b) temporarily balancing out residual emissions from hard-to-decarbonize sectors (like construction, heavy industry, and heavy transport), while solutions for these sectors are being developed and just transformations with jobtransitions are taking place (Buck et al, 2020), and/or (c) to return to historical CO 2 concentrations through a phase of global net-negative emissions after achievement of complete decarbonization. Additionally, there is d) a moral argument interpreting well-established principles of distributive justice such that countries with significant historical emissions and technological capacities ought to act as first movers and attempt to drive down the cost of CDR so that others have access to a larger set of mitigation options (Fyson et al, 2020;Pozo et al, 2020).…”

“…CDR used to achieve net-zero emissions compatible with the Paris Agreement's long-term temperature goal may sometimes be viewed as a stop-gap measure [a temporary measure to mitigate immediate harm and buy time for a permanent solution; Buck et al (2020)], but given that most governments are not expected to achieve full decarbonization within appropriate carbon budgets (if ever), CDR may need to be attributed a more permanent role (Morrow et al, 2020). The corresponding paradigm shift -requiring a novel understanding of climate change mitigation as the composite of both emissions reductions and removals -may require a reorientation and a strengthened political mandate for consequent public policy (Geden et al, 2019).…”

Navigating Potential Hype and Opportunity in Governing Marine Carbon Removal

“…The Paris Agreement has since cemented two critical roles for CDR. First, the 1.5 • C aspiration brought CDR-heavy pathways to the fore as a way to further stretch the near-term carbon budget: a time-buying (Low and Boettcher, 2020) or stopgap strategy (Buck et al, 2020a) to ease impacts for vulnerable industries and populations during low carbon transitions. Second, the commitment to achieve Net Zero from "a balance of sources and sinks" makes CDR essential for capturing residual emissions accumulating in the atmosphere from the (transitioning) carbon economy (Morrow et al, 2020).…”

Delaying decarbonization: Climate governmentalities and sociotechnical strategies from Copenhagen to Paris

“…Relative gains were sought to sustain the negotiations agenda at the UNFCCC ( Dimitrov, 2010 ; Khan and Roberts, 2013 ). Rationalities on the value of ‘bridging’ and ‘time-buying’ options began to solidify, ranging from transitional fuels that might temporarily substitute for high-carbon fuels on route to renewables, to wider strategies that might reduce climate impacts and allow room for polities and economies to adapt and transition in the near term ( Buck et al, 2020 ). Appeals to an array of nongovernmental stakeholders and to the world's ‘most vulnerable’ became an increasing anchor for relevance and legitimacy ( Bäckstrand and Lövbrand, 2016 ).…”