Everett and Evidence

Greaves, H. R. G.; Myrvold, Wayne C.

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199560561.003.0011

Cited by 49 publications

(57 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…An observable change in Beauty's credence in the QSBP experiment would constitute an example of such an experiment and thus we find it unlikely. Moreover, in the framework of the decision theory, Greaves and Myrvold (2010) argued that a believer in the MWI should make the same rational decisions as an agent who believes in a Collapse theory.…”

Section: The Nature Of a Fair Coinmentioning

confidence: 99%

The measure of existence of a quantum world and the Sleeping Beauty Problem

Groisman¹,

Hallakoun²,

Vaidman³

2013

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An attempt to resolve the controversy regarding the solution of the Sleeping Beauty Problem in the framework of the Many-Worlds Interpretation led to a new controversy regarding the Quantum Sleeping Beauty Problem. We apply the concept of a measure of existence of a world and reach the solution known as 'thirder' solution which differs from Peter Lewis's 'halfer' assertion. We argue that this method provides a simple and powerful tool for analysing rational decision theory problems.

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Section: The Nature Of a Fair Coinmentioning

confidence: 99%

The measure of existence of a quantum world and the Sleeping Beauty Problem

Groisman¹,

Hallakoun²,

Vaidman³

2013

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“…Because of this, the argument that you should assign probability one to the certain event equally applies to events that you only 8 Pitowsky attempts to argue along these lines [22], unsuccessfully in my view. 9 This has been suggested in the context of the many-worlds interpretation [28].…”

Section: Noncontextuality In Subjective Bayesianismmentioning

confidence: 91%

“It from Bit” and the Quantum Probability Rule

Leifer

2015

The Frontiers Collection

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I argue that, on the subjective Bayesian interpretation of probability, "it from bit" requires a generalization of probability theory. This does not get us all the way to the quantum probability rule because an extra constraint, known as noncontextuality, is required. I outline the prospects for a derivation of noncontextuality within this approach and argue that it requires a realist approach to physics, or "bit from it". I then explain why this does not conflict with "it from bit". This version of the essay includes an addendum responding to the open discussion that occurred on the FQXi website. It is otherwise identical to the version submitted to the contest.

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“…The strategy is to start without making any assumptions about probability in an Everettian setting and to end by showing that a rational agent who both fully accepts Everettian quantum 7 Greaves and Myrvold [2010] discuss in depth the considerations that should lead us to expect the rationality constraints to hold equally in a branching case as in an ordinary non-branching case.…”

Section: Decision Theory To the Rescue?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…6 Greaves and Myrvold [2010] dub this problem the evidential problem and I will follow their terminology.…”

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confidence: 99%

Everettian quantum mechanics and physical probability: Against the principle of “State Supervenience”

Jansson

2016

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in

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A note on versions:The version presented here may differ from the published version or from the version of record. If you wish to cite this item you are advised to consult the publisher's version. Please see the repository url above for details on accessing the published version and note that access may require a subscription.For more information, please contact eprints@nottingham.ac.uk EVERETTIAN QUANTUM MECHANICS AND PHYSICAL PROBABILITY:AGAINST THE PRINCIPLE OF "STATE SUPERVENIENCE" Lina JanssonAbstract. Everettian quantum mechanics faces the challenge of how to make sense of probability and probabilistic reasoning in a setting where there is typically no unique outcome of measurements.Wallace has built on a proof by Deutsch to argue that a notion of probability can be recovered in the many worlds setting. In particular, Wallace argues that a rational agent has to assign probabilities in accordance with the Born rule. This argument relies on a rationality constraint that Wallace calls state supervenience. I argue that state supervenience is not defensible as a rationality constraint for Everettian agents unless we already invoke probabilistic notions. idajansson@ntu.edu.sg Nanyang Technological UniversityPhilosophy Programme 14 Nanyang Drive Singapore 637 332Thank you to Wayne Myrvold for discussions of very early ideas in this paper in the "Many-Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics" seminar at the University of Michigan. Thanks to Dave Baker and Dan Peterson for many helpful discussions in the same seminar. A particular thanks to Chip Sebens for helpful comments on an earlier draft. Thank you also to the audiences at the 2013 AAP and the 2014 NUS workshop in formal epistemology for their comments, suggestions, and objections. Finally, thank you to the members of the Nottingham reading group. This work was partially supported by a grant from Nanyang Technological University and a visiting fellowship from the University of Nottingham. EVERETTIAN QUANTUM MECHANICS AND PHYSICAL PROBABILITY: AGAINST THE PRINCIPLE OF "STATE SUPERVENIENCE"Abstract. Everettian quantum mechanics faces the challenge of how to make sense of probability and probabilistic reasoning in a setting where there is typically no unique outcome of measurements.Wallace has built on a proof by Deutsch to argue that a notion of probability can be recovered in the many worlds setting. In particular, Wallace argues that a rational agent has to assign probabilities in accordance with the Born rule. This argument relies on a rationality constraint that Wallace calls state supervenience. I argue that state supervenience is not defensible as a rationality constraint for Everettian agents unless we already invoke probabilistic notions.

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Everett and Evidence

Cited by 49 publications

References 20 publications

The measure of existence of a quantum world and the Sleeping Beauty Problem

The measure of existence of a quantum world and the Sleeping Beauty Problem

“It from Bit” and the Quantum Probability Rule

Everettian quantum mechanics and physical probability: Against the principle of “State Supervenience”

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