Every Thing Must Go

Ladyman, James; Ross, Don; Collier, and David Spurrett with John

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199276196.001.0001

Cited by 1,022 publications

(215 citation statements)

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“…However, since we take the entire algebra and state space together, the framework does not ontologically privilege the empirical quantities determined by the initial conditions of the world we actually live, all possible empirical quantities have equal status. This might be taken to constitute precisely the ontological commitment to modal structure that, according to Ladyman and Ross (2007), is the key feature distinguishing OSR from the structural empiricism of van Fraassen (2006van Fraassen ( , 2008 .…”

Section: Interpretation Of Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Ontic structural realism (OSR) (Ladyman 1998;French and Ladyman 2003;Ladyman and Ross 2007) is in part motivated by two arguments towards the underdetermination of the ontology associated with traditional realist descriptions of science. 1 The first is formulation underdetermination, and springs from the multiplicity of empirically equivalent formulations of a given theory (Jones 1991;Bain 2009;French 2011).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Quantization as a Guide to Ontic Structure

Thébault

2016

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

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The ontic structural realist stance is motivated by a desire to do philosophical justice to the success of science, whilst withstanding the metaphysical undermining generated by the various species of ontological underdetermination. We are, however, as yet in want of general principles to provide a scaffold for the explicit construction of structural ontologies. Here we will attempt to bridge this gap by utilising the formal procedure of quantization as a guide to ontic structure of modern physical theory. The example of non-relativistic particle mechanics will be considered and, for that case, it will be shown that a viable candidate for an OSR framework can be constituted in terms of the combination of a state space, with Poisson bracket structure, and a set of observables, with Lie algebra structure.

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Section: Interpretation Of Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Quantization as a Guide to Ontic Structure

Thébault

2016

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

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“…First note that there is no logical contradiction in a state of affairs which includes humans who sense π. 25 If we first assume, contrary to the preceding paragraph, that unlike concrete objects, abstract objects are non-causal, then a logical contradiction could be derived from the sentence "a human can sense π where π is an abstract object and sensing requires causal contact." However since the nature of abstract objects is whats under investigation, we cannot presuppose an answer to that question.…”

Section: Qg and Abstract Objectsmentioning

confidence: 95%

Incubating a future metaphysics: quantum gravity

Norton

2017

Synthese

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“…10 structuralism will be easier to secure in the spacetime case. (See Ladyman and Ross (2007), Section 3.2 for discussion of it.) 10 Afficionados of 'group structural realism' will rightly object at this point that I am simply ignoring the claim that even intrinsic features of fundamental objects may be accounted for structurally -namely, by utilizing the symmetry structures that are so central to contemporary physics theories (see, e.g.…”

Section: Osr As a Fundamentality Thesismentioning

confidence: 99%

Looking forward, not back: Supporting structuralism in the present

McKenzie

2016

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A

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The view that the fundamental kind properties are intrinsic properties enjoys reflexive endorsement by most metaphysicians of science. But ontic structural realists deny that there are any fundamental intrinsic properties at all. Given that structuralists distrust intuition as a guide to truth, and given that we currently lack a fundamental physical theory that we could consult instead to order settle the issue, it might seem as if there is simply nowhere for this debate to go at present. However, I will argue that there exists an as-yet untapped resource for arguing for ontic structuralism -namely, the way that fundamentality is conceptualized in our most fundamental physical frameworks. By arguing that physical objects must be subject to the 'Goldilock's principle' if they are to count as fundamental, I argue that we can no longer view the majority of properties defining them as intrinsic. As such, ontic structural realism can be regarded as the right metaphysics for fundamental physics, and that this is so even though we do not yet claim to know precisely what that fundamental physics is.

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Every Thing Must Go

Cited by 1,022 publications

References 0 publications

Quantization as a Guide to Ontic Structure

Quantization as a Guide to Ontic Structure

Incubating a future metaphysics: quantum gravity

Looking forward, not back: Supporting structuralism in the present

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