Everyday Politics of Dadan Contracts in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh

Abstract

This article analyses processes of dadan contract negotiations between Bengali intermediaries and indigenous Tanchangya peasants of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh, in the culantro sector. The research extends the debates on the dadan system and interlocked market relationships by highlighting everyday dynamics of dadan and the issue of 'just price' that arises from such contracts. The article argues that the dadan loan system leads to greater spaces for exploitation. While it facilitates peasants' access to credit for agricultural and social reproduction and the supply of culantro to wider national markets, it also creates a dependency of Tanchangya peasants on Bengali moneylending traders. Such an analysis reveals the limitations of existing studies on dadan in accounting for the social, cultural and political aspects of dadan contracts, alongside their economic aspects. The article concludes that contested moralities associated with the pursuit of familial subsistence and contractual obligations shape peasants' decisions and strategies concerning such contracts.1. Traders advance loans against standing crops for the purchase of those crops at predetermined prices that are below the market rate.

Ethnonationalism in the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh and India’s Security Concerns in Northeast India

“…Public protest against the authorities was an impossible phenomenon during that period. The protests were isolated and the participation of common people failed to stop the construction of the dam (Chakma et al 1995: 86–96; Nayak 2019). Responding to the state suppression, an organization was formed in the year 1973 called Parbatya Chattagram Janasanghati Samity (PCJSS) under the leadership of Manabendra Larma, which launched a struggle to get their rights in a democratic and non-violent way.…”

“…But later they changed their strategy of struggle from non-violent to armed struggle when the Mujib Government proclaimed Martial Law in 1975. The democratic protests gradually evolved into rebellion (Chakma et al 1995: 86–96). Thus, the relations between the displaced tribals and the government of Bangladesh gradually worsened in CHT and it turned into armed conflicts and insurgency (Hassan 1991: 24–25; Norwegian Refugee Council 2006: 27–28; Sopher 1963: 339–362).…”