Evidence Games: Truth and Commitment

Hart, Sergiu; Kremer, Ilan; Perry, Motty

doi:10.1257/aer.20150913

Cited by 89 publications

(37 citation statements)

References 28 publications

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“…Hart, Kremer, and Perry (), like us, assumed normality. Unlike us, they assumed type‐independent utility for the agent and assumed that the principal cannot randomize.…”

Section: Connection To the Literaturementioning

confidence: 86%

“…We make use of results in Bull and Watson () and Deneckere and Severinov (). Below, we discuss in more detail a particularly relevant part of this literature which identifies conditions under which the principal does not need commitment to obtain the same outcome as under the optimal mechanism, a result first shown by Glazer and Rubinstein (, ) and extended by Sher () and Hart, Kremer, and Perry ().…”

Section: Connection To the Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…In the Appendix of an earlier version of their paper, Hart, Kremer, and Perry () allowed the principal to randomize. Their main assumption states that if we fix any indifference curve for the agent, then there is a point on that indifference curve which is best for the principal independently of t .…”

Section: Connection To the Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

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Mechanisms With Evidence: Commitment and Robustness

Ben-Porath¹,

Dekel

Lipman

2019

ECTA

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We show that in a class of I‐agent mechanism design problems with evidence, commitment is unnecessary, randomization has no value, and robust incentive compatibility has no cost. In particular, for each agent i, we construct a simple disclosure game between the principal and agent i where the equilibrium strategies of the agents in these disclosure games give their equilibrium strategies in the game corresponding to the mechanism but where the principal is not committed to his response. In this equilibrium, the principal obtains the same payoff as in the optimal mechanism with commitment. As an application, we show that certain costly verification models can be characterized using equilibrium analysis of an associated model of evidence.

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“…Hart, Kremer, and Perry (), like us, assumed normality. Unlike us, they assumed type‐independent utility for the agent and assumed that the principal cannot randomize.…”

Section: Connection To the Literaturementioning

confidence: 86%

Section: Connection To the Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

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Mechanisms With Evidence: Commitment and Robustness

Ben-Porath¹,

Dekel

Lipman

2019

ECTA

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“…If the primitive authentication rate is not 20 Strausz (2016) recovers the revelation principle by modeling verification as a component of the outcome. 21 Evidence was introduced in games (without commitment) by Milgrom (1981) and Grossman (1981); for recent work on evidence games, see Hart et al (2017), Ben-Porath et al (2017), and Koessler and Perez-Richet (2017). 22 For some fixed p ∈ (0, 1), the authentication probability α(θ ′ |θ) equals p if θ ′ = θ and 1 if θ ′ = θ.…”

Section: Review Of Verification Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Probabilistic Verification in Mechanism Design

Ball

Kattwinkel

2019

Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation

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We introduce a model of probabilistic verification in a mechanism design setting. The principal verifies the agent's claims with statistical tests. The agent's probability of passing each test depends on his type. In our framework, the revelation principle holds. We characterize whether each type has an associated test that best screens out all the other types. In that case, the testing technology can be represented in a tractable reduced form. In a quasilinear environment, we solve for the revenue-maximizing mechanism by introducing a new expression for the virtual value that encodes the effect of testing.

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“…Each of the cards is equally likely to be any integer value between 1 and 9, and all 11 A similar refinement has recently been used by Hart et al (2017). 12 See Appendix D for a copy of the instructions.…”

Section: Experimental Design and Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Communication With Partially Verifiable Information: An Experiment

2018

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.The focus for the Centre is research into individual and strategic decision-making using a combination of theoretical and experimental methods. On the theory side, members of the Centre investigate individual choice under uncertainty, cooperative and non-cooperative game theory, as well as theories of psychology, bounded rationality and evolutionary game theory. Members of the Centre have applied experimental methods in the fields of public economics, individual choice under risk and uncertainty, strategic interaction, and the performance of auctions, markets and other economic institutions. Much of the Centre's research involves collaborative projects with researchers from other departments in the UK and overseas.Please visit http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/cedex for more information about the Centre or contact AbstractWe use laboratory experiments to study communication games with partially verifiable information. In these games, based on Rubinstein (2004, 2006), an informed sender sends a two-dimensional message to a receiver, but only one dimension of the message can be verified. We compare a treatment where the receiver chooses which dimension to verify with one where the sender has this verification control. We find significant differences in outcomes across treatments. Specifically, receivers are more likely to observe senders' best evidence when senders have verification control. However, receivers' payoffs do not differ significantly across treatments, suggesting they are not hurt by delegating verification control. We also show that in both treatments the receiver's best reply to senders' observed behavior is close to the optimal strategy identified by Glazer and Rubinstein.

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Evidence Games: Truth and Commitment

Cited by 89 publications

References 28 publications

Mechanisms With Evidence: Commitment and Robustness

Mechanisms With Evidence: Commitment and Robustness

Probabilistic Verification in Mechanism Design

Communication With Partially Verifiable Information: An Experiment

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