Ž. We extend Kreps' 1979 analysis of preference for flexibility, reinterpreted by Kreps Ž . 1992 as a model of unforeseen contingencies. We enrich the choice set, consequently obtaining uniqueness results that were not possible in Kreps' model. We consider several representations and allow the agent to prefer commitment in some contingencies. In the representations, the agent acts as if she had coherent beliefs about a set of possible future Ž . ex post preferences, each of which is an expected-utility preference. We show that this set of ex post preferences, called the subjecti¨e state space, is essentially unique given the restriction that all ex post preferences are expected-utility preferences and is minimal even without this restriction. Because the subjective state space is identified, the way ex post utilities are aggregated into an ex ante ranking is also essentially unique. Hence when a representation that is additive across states exists, the additivity is meaningful in the sense that all representations are intrinsically additive. Uniqueness enables us to show that the size of the subjective state space provides a measure of the agent's uncertainty about future contingencies and that the way the states are aggregated indicates whether these contingencies lead to a desire for flexibility or commitment.
Standard economic intuition would say that private provision of public goods will be inefficient due to free-rider problems. This view is in contrast to the results in the literature on full implementation where it is shown that (under certain conditions) games exist which only have efficient equilibria. The games usually used to demonstrate existence are quite complex and seem "unnatural", possibly leading to the perception that implementation requires a central authority to choose and impose the game. In a simple public goods setting, we show that a very natural game-similar to one often used elsewhere in the literature to model private provision-in fact fully implements the core of this economy in undominated perfect equilibria. More specifically, we consider a complete information economy with one private good and two possible social decisions. Agents voluntarily contribute any non-negative amount of the private good they choose and the social decision is to provide the public good iff contributions are sufficient to pay for it. The contributions are refunded otherwise. The set of undominated perfect equilibrium outcomes of this game is exactly the core of the economy. We give some extensions of this result, discuss the role of perfection and alternative equilibrium notions, and discuss the intuition and implications of the results.
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